Details
Captured output (verbatim):
mcp gem version under test: 0.18.0
transport source: [".../gems/mcp-0.18.0/lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb", 333]
========== ATTACK: forged Host: attacker.evil.com Origin: http://evil.attacker.com ==========
[initialize] HTTP status : 200
[initialize] Mcp-Session-Id : "d4fb30b4-b4ec-49a1-a58b-f4cc02bee64b"
[initialize] response body : {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{"tools":{"listChanged":true},"prompts":{"listChanged":true},"resources":{"listChanged":true},"logging":{}},"serverInfo":{"name":"poc_server","version":"1.0.0"}}}
[tools/call] HTTP status : 200
[tools/call] response body : data: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"TOP-SECRET-LOCAL-DATA-9f3a"}],"isError":false}}
ATTACK VERDICT: EXFILTRATED -- foreign Host/Origin obtained a session AND read the local secret with NO 403.
========== NEGATIVE CONTROL: legitimate Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8080 ==========
[initialize] HTTP status : 200
[initialize] Mcp-Session-Id : "bf707a19-a22a-4ff2-aeae-62c20cd7141b"
CONTROL VERDICT: legitimate client also gets HTTP 200 + session -- transport applies the SAME (zero) Host/Origin policy to both.
The forged Host: attacker.evil.com / Origin: http://evil.attacker.com request obtained a valid session and exfiltrated the local secret (TOP-SECRET-LOCAL-DATA-9f3a) via tools/call, with the transport returning HTTP 200 throughout and never a 403. The negative control confirms the transport applies the identical (empty) policy to a legitimate localhost client, proving there is no Host/Origin discrimination at all.
Suggested fix
Add an opt-in but secure-by-default Host/Origin allowlist to StreamableHTTPTransport, mirroring the DNS-rebinding protection that the TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust, C#, and Java MCP SDKs already ship:
- Accept
allowed_hosts:andallowed_origins:keyword arguments ininitialize. - In
handle_request(before any dispatch), readrequest.env["HTTP_HOST"]andrequest.env["HTTP_ORIGIN"]. If an allowlist is configured and the value is not on it, return403 Forbidden. - Default to allowing only loopback hosts (
127.0.0.1,[::1],localhost) and an empty/absentOrigin, so a stock local deployment is protected against rebinding out of the box while same-process and same-host clients keep working. Document how to widen the allowlist for non-loopback deployments.
A concrete patch adds an AllowedHostsValidation check invoked at the top of handle_request. See the Fix PR.
Fix PR
A fix PR implementing the Host/Origin allowlist with a secure loopback default is open against this advisory's private temporary fork: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk-ghsa-rjr6-rcgv-9m7m/pull/1 . With the patch loaded, the forged-Host request is rejected with 403 ({"error":"Forbidden: Host not allowed (DNS-rebinding protection)"}) while a legitimate loopback Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 request is still served (HTTP 200, session issued).
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
Reporter notes
This issue was found by source review of the mcp gem's Streamable HTTP transport and confirmed end-to-end against the released gem mcp 0.18.0 as shown above. It is reported independently on its own merits.