Advisory

GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp

Also known as: CVE-2026-72816, GO-2026-5777

Summary

chi's RealIP Middleware allows IP spoofing via unvalidated X-Forwarded-For header

Details

Summary
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls

Details

the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP() function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces r.RemoteAddr without checking if the request came from a trusted proxy

func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
    var ip string
    if tcip := r.Header.Get(trueClientIP); tcip != "" {
        ip = tcip  // controlled by attacker
    } else if xrip := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); xrip != "" {
        ip = xrip  // controlled by attacker
    } else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
        ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",")  // controlled by attacker
    }
    // ...
    return ip
}

no trusted proxy cidr check in place, any client can send these headers

PoC

create a server with chi and use realip middleware

package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "net/http"
    "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
    "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)

func main() {
    r := chi.NewRouter()
    r.Use(middleware.RealIP)

    r.Get("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        // ip-based access control got bypassed
        if r.RemoteAddr == "127.0.0.1" {
            w.Write([]byte("SECRET ADMIN DATA"))
            return
        }
        http.Error(w, "Forbidden", 403)
    })

    http.ListenAndServe(":8080", r)
}

spoofed the ip to bypass access control

curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1" http://localhost:8080/admin

Impact

  • ip-based access control bypass lets attackers reach restricted endpoints
  • rate limiting bypass lets attackers avoid limits by rotating spoofed ips
  • audit logs show fake ips picked by attacker instead of real ones
  • attackers can get around geo ip restrictions

Remediation Recommendation

validate proxy cidr first before trusting forwarded ip headers

// add your reverse proxy ip addresses here
var trustedProxies = []net.IPNet{
       {IP: net.ParseIP("10.0.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(8, 32)},
    {IP: net.ParseIP("172.16.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(12, 32)},
    {IP: net.ParseIP("192.168.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(16, 32)},
}

func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP) bool {
    for _, cidr := range trustedProxies {
        if cidr.Contains(ip) {
            return true
        }
    }
    return false
}

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-25 18:19 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 1.5.5 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 2.1.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 3.3.5 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 4.1.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 5.3.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

5.3.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences