vcrpy
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed8.2.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
8.2.1
Fix
- Fixed version
8.2.1pip install --upgrade vcrpy==8.2.1
Advisory
Also known as: None
VCR.py: Arbitrary code execution via unsafe YAML deserialization of cassette files
Summary
vcrpy deserializes YAML cassette files with PyYAML's object-constructing loader (yaml.CLoader / yaml.Loader) instead of the safe loader (yaml.CSafeLoader / yaml.SafeLoader). A cassette containing a !!python/object/apply: (or similar) tag therefore executes arbitrary Python code the moment the cassette is loaded — including through the normal VCR().use_cassette() path, before any HTTP interaction is replayed.
This is not limited to environments lacking the libYAML C extension. CLoader uses the C parser but PyYAML's full Python *constructor*, so Python
object tags execute under CLoader exactly as under the pure-Python Loader. Confirmed against vcrpy 8.1.1 + PyYAML 6.0.3 with CLoader active.
Affected component
vcr/serializers/yamlserializer.py — deserialize() → yaml.load(cassette_string, Loader=Loader) where Loader is CLoader/Loader. Reached on every cassette load.vcr/migration.py (~line 107) — yaml.load(preprocess_yaml(...), Loader=Loader). A second sink reached when the migration tool is run on a .yaml file. preprocess_yaml() only strips three known legacy tags, so other tags still execute.Present in all releases inspected, 1.0.0 through 8.1.1.
Proof of concept
import vcr, requests
# Attacker-supplied cassette. The payload sits in an ignored top-level key
# so the rest of the cassette stays valid; it fires during load.
open("evil.yaml", "w").write("""interactions:
- request:
body: null
headers: {Accept: ['*/*']}
method: GET
uri: http://example.com/
response:
body: {string: ok}
headers: {Content-Type: ['text/plain']}
status: {code: 200, message: OK}
_x: !!python/object/apply:os.system ['touch /tmp/VCRPY_YAML_RCE']
version: 1
""")
with vcr.use_cassette("evil.yaml"): # <-- /tmp/VCRPY_YAML_RCE created here
requests.get("http://example.com/")
Loading the cassette creates /tmp/VCRPY_YAML_RCE, demonstrating arbitrary command execution. Any Python callable can be invoked this way.
Impact
Arbitrary code execution in the process that loads the cassette, with that process's full privileges. Realistic delivery paths:
Because cassettes are typically loaded by test suites in CI/CD and on developer machines, the exposed secrets are exactly the high-value ones in those environments: CI deployment credentials, cloud IAM roles, registry/publishing tokens, and source access.
Patch
Use the safe loader in vcr/serializers/yamlserializer.py:
try:
from yaml import CDumper as Dumper
from yaml import CSafeLoader as Loader
except ImportError:
from yaml import Dumper
from yaml import SafeLoader as Loader
def deserialize(cassette_string):
return yaml.load(cassette_string, Loader=Loader)
Apply the same SafeLoader change in vcr/migration.py.
This is backwards compatible: vcrpy cassettes only contain standard YAML (scalars/lists/maps plus !!binary, all supported by SafeLoader/CSafeLoader), so existing cassettes load unchanged. vcrpy's serialize.deserialize() already catches yaml.constructor.ConstructorError, so a Python-tagged cassette now surfaces as the existing "old cassette format" ValueError instead of executing.
Recommended hardening: add a regression test that loads a cassette containing !!python/object/apply:os.system and asserts a ConstructorError/ValueError and that no side effect occurs.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 8.2.1 (ecosystem)8.2.1
8.2.1pip install --upgrade vcrpy==8.2.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0