Details
In each case, the victim application initiates a normal FTP connection. The malicious server sends an unterminated multiline banner before authentication. The vulnerable client then buffers and reparses the response indefinitely.
No FTP credentials are required for exploitation because the attack happens before login.
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Suggested fix
Introduce a maximum control response buffer size, especially for incomplete multiline responses.
Recommended changes:
- Add a
maxControlResponseBytesormaxControlResponseLengthlimit. - Enforce the limit before or immediately after appending new control-channel data.
- Close the connection and reject the active task when the limit is exceeded.
- Add regression tests for unterminated multiline responses.
Example defensive logic:
if (completeResponse.length > maxControlResponseLength) {
closeWithError(new Error("FTP control response exceeded maximum allowed size"))
}
A regression test should verify that a response beginning with 220- and never terminating with 220 is rejected after the configured size limit instead of being retained indefinitely.
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Suggested regression test scenario
A test server should:
- Accept a client connection.
- Send an FTP multiline response opener such as
220-malicious banner\r\n. - Continue sending additional lines without ever sending the terminating
220line. - Verify that the client rejects the connection once the configured response-size limit is exceeded.
- Verify that
_partialResponsedoes not grow without bound.
Credit request
If you publish an advisory or assign a CVE, please credit me as:
Ali Firas (thesmartshadow) - https://www.smartshadow.dev