Advisory

GHSA-rpr9-rxv7-x643

Also known as: CVE-2026-44990

Summary

Apostrophe has default XSS via xmp raw-text passthrough in sanitize-html

Details

Summary
Under the default configuration, sanitize-html can turn attacker-controlled content inside a disallowed xmp element into live HTML or JavaScript. This is a sanitizer bypass in the default disallowedTagsMode: 'discard' path and can lead to stored XSS in applications that render sanitized output back to users.

Details
In [email protected], the default nonTextTags list includes only script, style, textarea, and option in index.js lines 138-142. That means disallowed xmp tags are not treated as "drop the entire contents" tags.

Later, in the ontext handler at index.js lines 569-577, the code special-cases textarea and xmp and appends their text content directly to the output without escaping:

} else if ((options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard' || options.disallowedTagsMode === 'completelyDiscard') && (tag === 'textarea' || tag === 'xmp')) {
  result += text;
}

Because htmlparser2 treats xmp as a raw-text element, markup inside xmp is parsed as text on input but becomes live markup again once it is appended unescaped to the sanitized output.

This creates a default sanitizer bypass. For example, a disallowed <xmp> wrapper can be used to smuggle <script> or event-handler payloads through sanitization.

The README also appears to contradict the implementation. In the "Discarding the entire contents of a disallowed tag" section, the documented exception list names only style, script, textarea, and option, and does not mention xmp.

PoC
Tested locally against [email protected] on Node.js v25.2.1.

  1. Install the package:
npm install sanitize-html
  1. Run the following script:
const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html');

console.log(sanitizeHtml('<xmp><script>alert(1)</script></xmp>'));
console.log(sanitizeHtml('<xmp><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></xmp>'));
console.log(sanitizeHtml('<xmp><svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg></xmp>'));
  1. Observed output:
<script>alert(1)</script>
<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg>
  1. Render any of the returned strings in a browser context that trusts sanitize-html output, for example:
const dirty = '<xmp><script>alert(1)</script></xmp>';
const clean = sanitizeHtml(dirty);

If clean is inserted into the DOM or stored and later rendered as trusted HTML, the attacker-controlled script executes.

Impact
This is a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the default sanitizer behavior. Any application that uses sanitize-html defaults and then renders the returned HTML as trusted output is impacted. A remote attacker who can submit HTML content can trigger execution of arbitrary JavaScript in another user's browser when that content is viewed.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-05-14 18:26 UTC
Modified
2026-06-12 22:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

sanitize-html

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.17.3, fixed 2.17.4 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.17.4

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences