secure_headers
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed7.3.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
7.3.0
Fix
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Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54163
Secure Headers: CSP directive injection via sandbox, plugin_types, and report_to when given untrusted input
Summary
secure_headers builds the Content-Security-Policy value by stitching every configured directive together with ; separators. Three directive builders (build_sandbox_list_directive, build_media_type_list_directive, build_report_to_directive) interpolate caller-supplied strings into that value without scrubbing ;, \r, or \n.
When an application forwards untrusted input into SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives (or append_…) for :sandbox, :plugin_types, or :report_to, an attacker can embed a literal ; and inject an arbitrary CSP directive into the header value. Because :sandbox and :plugin_types both sort alphabetically before :script_src in BODY_DIRECTIVES, the injected script-src lands earlier in the header and wins under the CSP first-occurrence rule, defeating the application's real script-src. End result: an 'unsafe-inline' * policy is forced for inline <script> despite the configured strict CSP, giving full XSS reachability anywhere reflected or stored content meets one of these three sinks.
An existing ;/\n scrub is already present in the source-list builder (build_source_list_directive), but the three sibling builders here never received the same treatment and still emit caller bytes verbatim into the CSP value.
Impact
Although piping untrusted input into CSP directives is generally discouraged, applications that do so for one of the three uncovered directives turn that endpoint into an XSS sink with an effective * 'unsafe-inline' script-src, even though the global config says script_src: %w('self'). The same primitive can also be used to point report-to / report-uri at attacker infrastructure to silently siphon CSP violation reports — which include the violated URL, blocked-uri, source-file, line-number and a sample-snippet, useful for fingerprinting and for harvesting victim-internal URLs.
The global default CSP set in Configuration.default is supposed to be a backstop: even if a controller appends a single risky value, the strict script-src should remain the first match. This bug breaks that property by letting the appended value redefine the policy header upstream of the legitimate script-src.
Affected
secure_headers (RubyGems)<= 7.2.07.3.0Applications that set :sandbox, :plugin_types, or :report_to only from static configuration (no per-request or per-tenant input) are not exploitable and need only the version bump. Applications that pipe any user-controlled value into one of those three directives via the per-controller override APIs are exploitable and should both upgrade and audit those code paths.
Mitigations / Workarounds
Until upgrading to 7.3.0, sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to:
SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directivesSecureHeaders.append_content_security_policy_directivesSecureHeaders.use_content_security_policy_named_appendfor :sandbox, :plugin_types, or :report_to. Reject or strip ;, \r, and \n from values destined for these directives before they reach the gem.
Vulnerable code
Three sibling builders all join an attacker-controllable value into the CSP header value with no ; / \r / \n scrubbing.
build_sandbox_list_directive:elsif sandbox_list && sandbox_list.any?
[
symbol_to_hyphen_case(directive),
sandbox_list.uniq
].join(" ")
end
build_media_type_list_directive (same pattern, for plugin-types).build_report_to_directive:def build_report_to_directive(directive)
return unless endpoint_name = @config.directive_value(directive)
if endpoint_name && endpoint_name.is_a?(String) && !endpoint_name.empty?
[symbol_to_hyphen_case(directive), endpoint_name].join(" ")
end
end
For comparison, `content_security_policy.rb#L117-L129` shows the source-list builder that already performs the scrub the three above are missing.
Validation also does not catch it:
validate_sandbox_expression! only checks v.start_with?("allow-"), so "allow-scripts allow-same-origin; script-src 'unsafe-inline' *" passes.validate_media_type_expression! uses /\A.+\/.+\z/; . matches ; and ', so "application/x-foo; script-src 'unsafe-inline' *" passes.validate_report_to_endpoint_expression! only checks String + non-empty.Reachable
The three sinks are reached by the documented public override APIs in `lib/secure_headers.rb#L61-L106` — override_content_security_policy_directives, append_content_security_policy_directives, and use_content_security_policy_named_append. These are the documented per-controller hooks Rails apps use to vary CSP per request (e.g. allowing an iframe domain that a user just configured, sandboxing a per-tenant subdocument, or wiring up a per-tenant reporting endpoint).
Concrete reachable shapes:
override_content_security_policy_directives(sandbox: [tenant.sandbox_tokens]).plugin_types: [tenant.allowed_mime].report_to: params[:report_group].In all three patterns, a string field that the app expects to be a single token (allow-forms, application/pdf, default) is the injection point.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 7.3.0 (ecosystem)7.3.0
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0