Advisory

GHSA-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j

Also known as: CVE-2026-110789

Summary

libp2p: ASN.1 DER decoder drives an unbounded synchronous loop on attacker-controlled length fields, stalling the Node event loop pre-auth

Details

Summary
A remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node's entire event loop for ~4–5 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted publicKey inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting.

Details
packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts readLength() parses DER long-form lengths with no comparison to buf.byteLength, and readInteger() then loops over the attacker-claimed length:

function readInteger (buf, context) {
  const length = readLength(buf, context)   // attacker-controlled, claims up to 2^64
  const end = context.offset + length
  for (let i = context.offset; i < end; i++) // runs far past buf.byteLength
    vals.push(buf[i])                         // pushes `undefined` past the end
}

The blob reaches the parser pre-auth: Identify runs on every connection:open and calls publicKeyFromProtobuf(publicKey) (packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts:85) before the connection.remotePeer.equals(id) check at identify.ts:88. The MAX_RSA_JWK_SIZE guard in pkixToRSAPublicKey only bounds the total blob size, not the inner length field, so a 15-byte payload defeats it; the ECDSA path (unmarshalECDSAPublicKey) has no cap at all. The decode runs in a single synchronous tick, so no AbortSignal — including Identify's 5 s timeout — can interrupt it. Verified on js-libp2p commit a04f5e0, where @libp2p/crypto reads 5.1.21.

PoC
Full PoC attached (libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (npm install --ignore-scripts && npm run build), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of packages/), then cd libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc && node attack.mjs. Expected:

[*] round 1: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[*] round 2: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4-5s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[*] round 3: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[!] Vulnerability reproduced: 3/3 connections each stalled the victim's event loop for ~4-5s — one crafted ~15-byte Identify publicKey per connection, pre-auth

The stall is measured from the victim's own 1 s heartbeat clock (frozen while the loop is blocked); the ~2 GB transient RSS peak is read from /proc/<pid>/status. The DER RangeError is swallowed by Identify's .catch(() => {}), so the node survives and every new connection re-stalls it; under a container memory limit the ~2 GB spike OOM-kills the process. A node attack.mjs control run (legitimate Identify) shows 0 s stalls.

Impact
CWE-130/CWE-400. Any node running the default Identify service is affected. A single peer can keep the node unresponsive to all of its peers (every new connection adds another multi-second stall — all timers, heartbeats, and protocol timeouts stop) and, in memory-constrained deployments, force an OOM kill. Suggested fix: in readLength, reject any long-form length whose value exceeds buf.byteLength - context.offset; in readInteger/readObjectIdentifier/readBitString/readOctetString, clamp or assert end/finalOffset against buf.byteLength before looping; add an overall DER-element-length sanity cap at decodeDer entry and a byte-length cap in unmarshalECDSAPublicKey.

libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-11-17 21:05 UTC
Modified
2026-11-17 21:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@libp2p/crypto

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 5.1.22 (semver)

Fixed versions

5.1.22

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences