github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.6.2(semver)
Fixed versions
3.6.2
Fix
- Fixed version
3.6.2go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-34448, GO-2026-5644
SiYuan: Stored XSS in Attribute View Gallery/Kanban Cover Rendering Allows Arbitrary Command Execution in Desktop Client
Summary
An attacker who can place a malicious URL in an Attribute View mAsse field can trigger stored XSS when a victim opens the Gallery or Kanban view with “Cover From -> Asset Field” enabled. The vulnerable code accepts arbitrary http(s) URLs without extensions as images, stores the attacker-controlled string in coverURL, and injects it directly into an <img src="..."> attribute without escaping. In the Electron desktop client, the injected JavaScript executes with nodeIntegration enabled and contextIsolation disabled, so the XSS reaches arbitrary OS command execution under the victim’s account.
Details
The vulnerable flow is:
IsPossiblyImage(assetPath) accepts arbitrary http(s) URLs without validating that they are safe image URLs.Cover From -> Asset Field, the application copies asset.Content directly into galleryCard.CoverURL / kanbanCard.CoverURL.coverURL directly into <img src="${getCompressURL(item.coverURL)}"> without escaping quotes or other attribute-breaking characters.https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc') breaks out of the src attribute and adds an attacker-controlled onerror handler.When the image fails to load, the injected JavaScript runs in the Electron renderer. Because the desktop app enables nodeIntegration: true and disables contextIsolation and webSecurity, that JavaScript can access Node.js APIs and execute system commands.
PoC
5.Set Cover From to Asset Field and choose the mAsset column.
https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc')
Example rendered output:
<img loading="lazy" class="av__gallery-img" src="https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc')">
Impact
An attacker can store malicious content in a database asset field and execute arbitrary JavaScript when another user opens the affected Gallery or Kanban view. In the desktop client, that JavaScript has access to Node.js APIs, so the impact is not limited to browser-context XSS. The payload executes OS commands with the victim’s local user privileges, which turns this into remote code execution on the desktop application once the malicious content is delivered and rendered.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 3.6.2 (semver)3.6.2
3.6.2go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0