Advisory

GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Defense-in-depth in SendTriggerTasks: enforce that task.UserID == alert.UserID || alertOwnerIsAdmin || taskOwnerIsAdmin.

Severity

  • PR:L because RoleMember credentials needed.
  • AC:H because attacker has to ID-guess admin cron IDs and have an alert-trip vector. (For a deployment where the attacker has visibility into max cron ID via UI hints or the id-query echo, AC drops to L.)
  • S:C because the cron command runs on every connected agent (different trust zone).
  • Auth: authenticated RoleMember.

Reproduction environment

  • Tested against: nezhahq/nezha master @ 50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a.
  • Code locations:
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:47-77 (createAlertRule), 91-131 (updateAlertRule), 169-196 (validateRule)
  • cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:404-445 (createService), 459-509 (updateService), 543-549 (validateServers)
  • service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127 (SendTriggerTasks), 133-181 (CronTrigger)
  • service/singleton/alertsentinel.go:170, 180 (alert-fire callsite)
  • service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:742-750 (service-fire callsite)

Reporter

Eddie Ran. Filed via reporter API. Companion to NEZHA-001/002 — same auth-bypass class but a different write path.

Sources & licences