Details
Defense-in-depth in SendTriggerTasks: enforce that task.UserID == alert.UserID || alertOwnerIsAdmin || taskOwnerIsAdmin.
Severity
- PR:L because RoleMember credentials needed.
- AC:H because attacker has to ID-guess admin cron IDs and have an alert-trip vector. (For a deployment where the attacker has visibility into max cron ID via UI hints or the
id-query echo, AC drops to L.) - S:C because the cron command runs on every connected agent (different trust zone).
- Auth: authenticated
RoleMember.
Reproduction environment
- Tested against:
nezhahq/nezhamaster @50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a. - Code locations:
cmd/dashboard/controller/alertrule.go:47-77(createAlertRule), 91-131 (updateAlertRule), 169-196 (validateRule)cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:404-445(createService), 459-509 (updateService), 543-549 (validateServers)service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127(SendTriggerTasks), 133-181 (CronTrigger)service/singleton/alertsentinel.go:170, 180(alert-fire callsite)service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:742-750(service-fire callsite)
Reporter
Eddie Ran. Filed via reporter API. Companion to NEZHA-001/002 — same auth-bypass class but a different write path.