Details
if success {
fmt.Printf("\n\nSuccess: Found OTP = %s\n", otpStr)
cancel()
return
}
}
}(start, end)
}
wg.Wait()
fmt.Println("Brute-force attempt finished.")
}
<img width="997" height="301" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/61486bb6-302b-4edb-87b7-d229bbd33380" />
### Impact
An attacker who gains access to a user’s account can exploit this bypass to perform protected actions such as accessing the user’s API key or deleting the user’s accounts and organisations.
### Remediation
The simplest fix is to ensure the updated number of attempts is persisted by calling `pa.data = pa_data.to_json()` before calling `pa.save(conn)`. However this still leaves open the possibility of an attacker requesting an OTP code, exhausting their six attempts and then requesting a new code to try. This attack succeeds with probability
```math
1 - \left(1 - \frac{6}{10^L}\right)^n,
which becomes non-neglible as $n$ increases.
Therefore the best approach might be to enforce a delay like this, to ensure that all rate limits are ultimately tied back to time:
diff --git a/src/api/core/two_factor/protected_actions.rs b/src/api/core/two_factor/protected_actions.rs
index 5e4a65be..aa9cb8f6 100644
--- a/src/api/core/two_factor/protected_actions.rs
+++ b/src/api/core/two_factor/protected_actions.rs
@@ -66,7 +66,18 @@ async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, mut conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if let Some(pa) =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &mut conn).await
{
- pa.delete(&mut conn).await?;
+ let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
+ let token_sent = DateTime::from_timestamp(pa_data.token_sent, 0)
+ .expect("Protected Action token timestamp invalid")
+ .naive_utc();
+ let elapsed = Utc::now().naive_utc() - token_sent;
+ let delay = TimeDelta::seconds(20);
+
+ if elapsed < delay {
+ err!(format!("Please wait {} seconds before requesting another code.", (delay - elapsed).num_seconds()));
+ } else {
+ pa.delete(&mut conn).await?;
+ }
}
let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
@@ -131,6 +142,7 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
}
if !crypto::ct_eq(&pa_data.token, otp) {
+ pa.data = pa_data.to_json();
pa.save(conn).await?;
err!("Token is invalid")
}