Advisory

GHSA-v75v-6fpf-gvw8

Also known as: CVE-2026-104252, GO-2026-6798

Summary

Vitess vttablet /twopcz reflected XSS

Details

From: xylove21
To: [email protected]
Subject: [Security Report] Vitess vttablet /twopcz reflected XSS
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2026 14:30:00 +0800

Summary

The twopczHandler in
go/vt/vttablet/tabletserver/twopcz.go (line 185) reflects the Action
and dtid form values directly into the HTML response body via
fmt.Fprintln(w, msg) — without HTML escaping. The response is served
as text/html; charset=utf-8, and Vitess's default acl policy is
allow-all, so the endpoint is reachable by anyone who can hit the
vttablet's HTTP port (default 15999, multiplexed with gRPC and MySQL
wire-protocol ports).

A crafted Action or dtid value yields a reflected XSS that
executes in the operator's browser with same-origin access to the
vttablet's debug endpoints. This includes /queryz (live query plans),
/querylogz (recent queries with bound values), /txlogz (transactions),
/debug/env (environment variables — may include MySQL/topology
credentials), /debug/vars (expvar stats), and /debug/pprof/* if
enabled.

The bug was introduced before v20.0.0 (long-standing) and was silently
fixed in commit 3140c1846c (merged 2026-06-09, PR #20255,
"tabletserver: escape reflected form values in twopcz handler"). The
fix replaces fmt.Fprintln(w, msg) with
fmt.Fprintln(w, html.EscapeString(msg)). **No released version of
Vitess contains the fix** — the fix lives only on main (current tip
33a3c0fafe69, 2026-06-23). There is no CVE, GHSA, or OSV entry
for this specific bug (verified 2026-06-24 against GitHub Advisory
Database, OSV.dev, and NVD).

Impact

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Type | Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) |
| CVSS 3.1 | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N = 7.7 HIGH |
| Attack Vector | Network (vttablet HTTP port 15999, multiplexed with gRPC/MySQL) |
| Attack Complexity | Low (craft URL, send to operator) |
| Privileges Required | None (default acl policy is allow-all) |
| User Interaction | Required (operator must visit crafted URL) |
| Scope | Changed (XSS chain reaction to other vttablet debug endpoints) |
| Confidentiality | High (query text, env vars, expvar stats) |
| Integrity | None (XSS itself doesn't change state) |
| Availability | None (XSS itself doesn't disrupt service) |

Affected versions (verified)

All released versions are vulnerable. The fix lives only on main:

| Tag | Released | twopcz.go line 185 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| v20.0.0 | 2024-06-27 | fmt.Fprintln(w, msg) | BUGGY |
| v20.0.1 - v20.0.6 | 2024 | fmt.Fprintln(w, msg) | BUGGY |
| v22.0.4 | 2026-02-27 | fmt.Fprintln(w, msg) | BUGGY |
| v23.0.3, v23.0.4 | 2026-02 / 2026-05 | fmt.Fprintln(w, msg) | BUGGY |
| v24.0.0, v24.0.1 | 2026-04 / 2026-05 | fmt.Fprintln(w, msg) | BUGGY |
| main (33a3c0fafe69) | 2026-06-23 | fmt.Fprintln(w, html.EscapeString(msg)) | FIXED |

Sensitive data exposed via the same-origin XSS chain

A successful XSS lands in the vttablet's origin. From there, the
attacker can fetch (via fetch() from injected JavaScript) the
following same-origin endpoints, all of which are unauthenticated by
default:

  • /twopcz — in-flight 2PC transactions (query text, parameters, dtid)
  • /queryz — live query plans
  • /querylogz — recent queries with bound values
  • /txlogz — transactions
  • /debug/env — environment variables (may include MySQL creds, topology credentials, encryption keys)
  • /debug/vars — expvar stats
  • /debug/pprof/* — CPU/memory profiles (if enabled)

Reproduction (independent, runnable PoC)

The PoC is a self-contained Go HTTP server that replicates the buggy
twopczHandler from Vitess v20.0.0 verbatim (using the same line-185
code). It runs on 127.0.0.1:15080 and returns the same response shape
as the real Vitess endpoint.

# 1) Build the PoC (Go 1.23+)
cd /path/to/finding/CVE-pending-twopcz-xss
go build -o /tmp/vitess-twopcz-poc ./poc.go

# 2) Start the buggy server
ADDR=127.0.0.1:15080 /tmp/vitess-twopcz-poc &

# 3) Reproduce — Test 1: bare GET (no params)
curl -sS -i "http://127.0.0.1:15080/twopcz"
# → Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8, status 200

# 4) Test 2: XSS via Action param (URL-encode the script tag)
curl -sS -i "http://127.0.0.1:15080/twopcz?Action=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E&dtid=zz"
# → Response body contains literal "<script>alert(1)</script>(zz): completed."
# → Browser executes the script as same-origin code

# 5) Test 3: XSS via dtid param (attribute-context payload)
curl -sS -i "http://127.0.0.1:15080/twopcz?Action=Demo&dtid=%3Cimg%20src%3Dx%20onerror%3Dalert(1)%3E"
# → Response body contains literal "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"
# → Browser fires the onerror handler as same-origin code

# 6) Run the 3x automated runner (writes evidence/run-{1,2,3}.log)
bash ./poc/run.sh

PoC result excerpt (from evidence/run-1.log):

--- Test 2: XSS via Action=<script>alert(1)</script> ---
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
...
<h2>WARNING: Actions on this page can jeopardize data integrity.</h2>
<script>alert(1)</script>(zz): completed.

PASS: payload reflected UNESCAPED (XSS exploitable in browser)

The PoC was run 3 times on the buggy server (all 3/3 PASS) and the same
code is byte-identical to the v20.0.0 commit 8aeb274f6c8e line 185.

Root cause (technical detail)

go/vt/vttablet/tabletserver/twopcz.go (v20.0.0 through v24.0.1):

// Line 185
fmt.Fprintln(w, msg)

msg is constructed earlier in the handler as:

msg := fmt.Sprintf("%s(%s): completed.", action, dtid)

with action and dtid coming from the form values
r.FormValue("Action") and r.FormValue("dtid"). The form values are
URL-decoded (so a + becomes a space, %3C becomes <) but never
HTML-escaped. The handler explicitly sets `Content-Type: text/html;
charset=utf-8(via the<!DOCTYPE html>` it writes first), so the
browser executes any injected <script> or attribute-context payload.

The fix in main (fmt.Fprintln(w, html.EscapeString(msg))) closes the
hole by HTML-escaping both action and dtid before reflection.

Suggested fix (already in main)

// Recommended minimal patch (already in main, needs backport to all release branches):
import "html"

func twopczHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    // ... existing logic ...
    msg := fmt.Sprintf("%s(%s): completed.", action, dtid)
    fmt.Fprintln(w, html.EscapeString(msg))  // ← was: fmt.Fprintln(w, msg)
}

Backport the fix to v20.0.x, v22.0.x, v23.0.x, and v24.0.x as patch
releases. The fix is one line and a one-line import "html" addition,
so the backport risk is minimal.

Workaround / mitigation (no patch available)

If you cannot upgrade to a fixed release immediately:

  1. Restrict the vttablet HTTP port (default 15999) to localhost only. vttablet can run with --tablet-allow-stats=false and --tablet-grpc-port configured separately from the HTTP port, or you can firewall the HTTP port at the network layer. The debug endpoints are not needed by production traffic.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-10-15 20:16 UTC
Modified
2026-11-05 23:26 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

vitess.io/vitess

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.23.5 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.23.5

Fix

vitess.io/vitess

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.24.0, fixed 0.24.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.24.2

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences