@budibase/server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.39.0(semver)
Fixed versions
3.39.0
Fix
- Fixed version
3.39.0npm install @budibase/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-50132
Budibase has an Account Impersonation Issue — Chat Identity Link Hijacking via Missing Consent & CSRF
Title
Chat Identity Link Hijacking — Attacker Can Silently Map Their Slack/Discord Identity to Any Authenticated Budibase User's Account
Severity
High — CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 7.3
Affected Product
packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.tsGET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoffVulnerability Type
---
Vulnerability Description
GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection.
The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker's `externalUserId`. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker's Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with "Authentication succeeded." — no indication of what was linked.
Route Registration
// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22
router.get(
"/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff",
controller.handoffChatLinkSession // registered in publicRoutes — zero auth middleware
)
Vulnerable Controller (full function)
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61–110
export async function handoffChatLinkSession(
ctx: UserCtx<void, string, { instance: string; token: string }>
) {
const token = resolveToken(ctx.params.token)
const session = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLinkSession(token)
if (!session) {
throw new HTTPError("Link token is invalid or has expired", 400)
}
assertSessionMatchesInstance({ workspaceId: session.workspaceId, instance: ctx.params.instance })
if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) {
// Unauthenticated: set return URL cookie, redirect to login
// After login, same URL is visited again → attack completes silently
utils.setCookie(ctx,
`/api/chat-links/${ctx.params.instance}/${token}/handoff`,
"budibase:returnurl",
{ sign: false } // ← unsigned cookie, but not an open redirect
)
ctx.redirect("/builder/auth/login")
return
}
const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)
const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)
// ↓↓↓ THE VULNERABLE WRITE — no consent check, no CSRF token ↓↓↓
await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({
provider: consumedSession.provider,
externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId, // ← ATTACKER's Slack ID
externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,
teamId: consumedSession.teamId,
globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId, // ← VICTIM's Budibase user ID
linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,
})
ctx.type = "text/html"
ctx.body = renderLinkSuccessPage() // ← "Authentication succeeded." — no disclosure to user
}
--
---
Step 1 — Attacker triggers /link in Slack
Attacker types /link to the Budibase Slack bot. Budibase server creates a Redis session:
Redis key: chatIdentityLinkSession:tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Redis value (exact structure from `ChatIdentityLinkSession` interface):
{
"token": "tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",
"tenantId": "acme",
"workspaceId": "ws_abc123",
"provider": "slack",
"externalUserId": "UA12345678",
"externalUserName": "attacker",
"teamId": "T_ACME_SLACK",
"createdAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:00.000Z",
"expiresAt": "2026-05-02T10:10:00.000Z"
}
Slack DM sent privately to attacker:
Link your Slack account to continue chatting with this agent.
https://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff
Key observation: This URL embeds the attacker's own externalUserId inside the token. The attacker has full control over which identity gets linked.
---
Step 2 — Attacker forwards URL to victim
Attacker posts in the company Slack:
@admin please click this to connect your Budibase account for AI agent access:
https://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff
---
Step 3 — Victim clicks link (authenticated)
HTTP Request (victim's browser):
GET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1
Host: budibase.company.com
Cookie: budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION
HTTP Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<title>Authentication succeeded</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Authentication succeeded.</p>
<script>
if (window.opener && !window.opener.closed) {
try { window.opener.focus(); window.close() } catch (error) {}
}
</script>
</body>
</html>
The victim sees "Authentication succeeded." with no mention of Slack, no mention of attacker, no mention of what capabilities were granted.
CouchDB global-db document written immediately after (exact structure from `upsertChatIdentityLink`):
{
"_id": "chatidentitylink_acme_slack_T_ACME_SLACK_UA12345678",
"tenantId": "acme",
"provider": "slack",
"externalUserId": "UA12345678",
"globalUserId": "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID",
"linkedAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z",
"linkedBy": "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID",
"externalUserName": "attacker",
"teamId": "T_ACME_SLACK",
"createdAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z",
"updatedAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z"
}
The mapping is now permanent. externalUserId = UA12345678 (attacker) → globalUserId = ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID (victim).
---
Step 4 — Attacker impersonates victim via AI agent
Attacker sends any message to the Budibase Slack bot from their own account (UA12345678).
The chat handler resolves the identity:
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421
const existingLink = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLink({
provider: AgentChannelProvider.SLACK,
externalUserId: "UA12345678", // ← attacker's Slack ID
teamId: "T_ACME_SLACK",
})
// existingLink.globalUserId = "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID"
const linkedUser = await getGlobalUser("ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID")
// All agent tool calls now execute with victim admin's permissions
The attacker can now ask the agent:
> "Show me all rows in the Customers table"
> "Trigger the 'Send Invoice' automation for customer ID 42"
> "What files are in the knowledge base?"
Each request runs with the victim admin's identity and permissions. The victim has no indication this is happening.
---
Step 3b — Variant: Victim Not Yet Authenticated
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.39.0 (semver)3.39.0
3.39.0npm install @budibase/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0