langflow
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.9.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.9.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.9.0pip install --upgrade langflow==1.9.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33873, PYSEC-2026-82
Langflow has Authenticated Code Execution in Agentic Assistant Validation
Description
1. Summary
The Agentic Assistant feature in Langflow executes LLM-generated Python code during its validation phase. Although this phase appears intended to validate generated component code, the implementation reaches dynamic execution sinks and instantiates the generated class server-side.
In deployments where an attacker can access the Agentic Assistant feature and influence the model output, this can result in arbitrary server-side Python execution.
2. Description
2.1 Intended Functionality
The Agentic Assistant endpoints are designed to help users generate and validate components for a flow. Users can submit requests to the assistant, which returns candidate component code for further processing.
A reasonable security expectation is that validation should treat model output as untrusted text and perform only static or side-effect-free checks.
The externally reachable endpoints are:
The request model accepts attacker-influenceable fields such as input_value, flow_id, provider, model_name, session_id, and max_retries:
2.2 Root Cause
In the affected code path, Langflow processes model output through the following chain:
/assist
→ execute_flow_with_validation()
→ execute_flow_file()
→ LLM returns component code
→ extract_component_code()
→ validate_component_code()
→ create_class()
→ generated class is instantiated
The assistant service reaches the validation path here:
The code extraction step occurs here:
The validation entry point is here:
The issue is that this validation path is not purely static. It ultimately invokes create_class() in lfx.custom.validate, where Python code is dynamically executed via exec(...), including both global-scope preparation and class construction.
As a result, LLM-generated code is treated as executable Python rather than inert data. This means the “validation” step crosses a trust boundary and becomes an execution sink.
The streaming path can also reach this sink when the request is classified into the component-generation branch:
3. Proof of Concept (PoC)
4. Impact
5. Exploitability Notes
This issue is most accurately described as an authenticated or feature-reachable code execution vulnerability, rather than an unconditional unauthenticated remote attack.
Severity depends on deployment model:
The assistant feature depends on an active user context:
Authentication sources include bearer token, cookie, or API key:
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 1.9.0 (ecosystem)1.9.0
1.9.0pip install --upgrade langflow==1.9.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0