Advisory

GHSA-vc9j-9wph-qghj

Also known as: CVE-2026-63628

Summary

mppx: Gas Draining with access list

Details

Details
When the server acts as the fee_payer, mppx 0.6.27 copies the client-supplied EIP-2930 access list verbatim into the cosigned fee-payer transaction. The TypeScript SDK's fee-payer cosigning path accepts any access_list the client includes in the 0x78 FeePayerEnvelope without inspecting its length or contents.

Access list gas is charged intrinsically — before any opcode executes — regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched.

An attacker submits a valid transferWithMemo alongside fabricated address-only access list entries. The server validates calldata and gas parameters but never inspects access_list length. It cosigns and broadcasts a transaction that costs the fee-payer wallet N × 2,400 extra gas per request with no corresponding work performed on-chain.

At the default of 180 entries and 100 Gwei max_fee_per_gas, this inflates the fee-payer cost from the normal ~51,287 gas to ~483,287 gas — a 9.4× multiplier — while staying within the FeePayerPolicy cap of 500K gas, the Node.js 16 KB header limit, and the Moderato RPC's eth_call simulation budget (verified empirically at 180 entries).

PoC
The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run:

unzip mppx_typescript_PoC.zip
cd mppx_typescript
docker build -t mppx-typescript-access-list .
docker run --rm mppx-typescript-access-list

There are more details in mppx_typescript/README.md

Impact
A malicious client can force the server to pay ~9.4x the normal transaction fee. This dramatically increases operational costs and completely destroys the profit margin on low-cost items.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-09-22 20:34 UTC
Modified
2026-09-22 21:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

mppx

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.8.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.8.2

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences