Details
Expected output
novu-client-1 | {"url":"http://cgnat-target:8080/workflow-http-step","addresses":[{"address":"100.64.0.20","family":4}],"validation":"ALLOW"}
cgnat-target-1 | [target] 100.64.0.10 POST /workflow-http-step
novu-client-1 | {"status":200,"body":"{\"marker\":\"NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK\"}\n"}
The chain is:
- Resolve hostname
cgnat-target→100.64.0.20(a CGNAT address). - Run Novu's
validateUrlSsrfagainst the URL — returnsALLOWbecause100.64.0.0/10is missing fromisPrivateIp. - Send the actual server-side HTTP POST → reaches the CGNAT-bound target → response with marker
NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OKis received.
Impact
Any Novu feature that allows a user to configure an outbound HTTP URL and relies on validateUrlSsrf may still reach 100.64.0.0/10. Impact is highest for:
- Alibaba Cloud deployments, where
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/may expose instance metadata. - Self-hosted deployments where
100.64.0.0/10routes to private infrastructure, service meshes, VPNs, carrier-grade NAT, or provider-side internal services. - Multi-tenant deployments where one tenant can configure workflow HTTP request steps or webhook filters that execute from shared worker/API infrastructure — cross-tenant SSRF primitive into provider-internal services.
Suggested remediation
- Replace regex matching with IP parsing and CIDR classification, e.g. using
ipaddr.jswithprocess(...)to normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6. - Treat only globally reachable public IPs as allowed by default (
addr.range() === 'unicast'after IPv4-mapped unwrap, or equivalent). - Explicitly deny all special-use ranges, including at least:
0.0.0.0/8,10.0.0.0/8,100.64.0.0/10,127.0.0.0/8,169.254.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16- multicast (
224.0.0.0/4), documentation (192.0.2.0/24,198.51.100.0/24,203.0.113.0/24,2001:db8::/32), benchmarking (198.18.0.0/15), reserved (240.0.0.0/4) - IPv6 ULA (
fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10), loopback (::1), and the IPv4-mapped variants of all of the above - Add regression tests for:
100.64.0.1,100.100.100.200- hostnames resolving to those addresses
- IPv4-mapped variants of denied IPv4 ranges (e.g.,
::ffff:100.64.0.1) - Consider connection-time validation or a guarded lookup agent so the actual request cannot resolve to a different IP than the preflight checked (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU mitigation).
Notes
This report is intentionally scoped to the concrete 100.64.0.0/10 bypass. Additional missed ranges exist in the current regex guard (multicast 224.0.0.0/4, broadcast 255.255.255.255, benchmarking, documentation, 0.0.0.0/8 outside /32, and IPv4-mapped variants), but CGNAT is the highest-confidence real-world issue because it includes a known cloud metadata endpoint (100.100.100.200 on Alibaba Cloud).