Advisory

GHSA-vg6v-j97m-h5xq

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Expected output

novu-client-1   | {"url":"http://cgnat-target:8080/workflow-http-step","addresses":[{"address":"100.64.0.20","family":4}],"validation":"ALLOW"}
cgnat-target-1  | [target] 100.64.0.10 POST /workflow-http-step
novu-client-1   | {"status":200,"body":"{\"marker\":\"NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK\"}\n"}

The chain is:

  1. Resolve hostname cgnat-target → 100.64.0.20 (a CGNAT address).
  2. Run Novu's validateUrlSsrf against the URL — returns ALLOW because 100.64.0.0/10 is missing from isPrivateIp.
  3. Send the actual server-side HTTP POST → reaches the CGNAT-bound target → response with marker NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK is received.

Impact

Any Novu feature that allows a user to configure an outbound HTTP URL and relies on validateUrlSsrf may still reach 100.64.0.0/10. Impact is highest for:

  • Alibaba Cloud deployments, where http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ may expose instance metadata.
  • Self-hosted deployments where 100.64.0.0/10 routes to private infrastructure, service meshes, VPNs, carrier-grade NAT, or provider-side internal services.
  • Multi-tenant deployments where one tenant can configure workflow HTTP request steps or webhook filters that execute from shared worker/API infrastructure — cross-tenant SSRF primitive into provider-internal services.

Suggested remediation

  • Replace regex matching with IP parsing and CIDR classification, e.g. using ipaddr.js with process(...) to normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6.
  • Treat only globally reachable public IPs as allowed by default (addr.range() === 'unicast' after IPv4-mapped unwrap, or equivalent).
  • Explicitly deny all special-use ranges, including at least:
  • 0.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16
  • multicast (224.0.0.0/4), documentation (192.0.2.0/24, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, 2001:db8::/32), benchmarking (198.18.0.0/15), reserved (240.0.0.0/4)
  • IPv6 ULA (fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10), loopback (::1), and the IPv4-mapped variants of all of the above
  • Add regression tests for:
  • 100.64.0.1, 100.100.100.200
  • hostnames resolving to those addresses
  • IPv4-mapped variants of denied IPv4 ranges (e.g., ::ffff:100.64.0.1)
  • Consider connection-time validation or a guarded lookup agent so the actual request cannot resolve to a different IP than the preflight checked (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU mitigation).

Notes

This report is intentionally scoped to the concrete 100.64.0.0/10 bypass. Additional missed ranges exist in the current regex guard (multicast 224.0.0.0/4, broadcast 255.255.255.255, benchmarking, documentation, 0.0.0.0/8 outside /32, and IPv4-mapped variants), but CGNAT is the highest-confidence real-world issue because it includes a known cloud metadata endpoint (100.100.100.200 on Alibaba Cloud).

Sources & licences