rack
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.2.23(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.2.23
Fix
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Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-26961
Rack's greedy multipart boundary parsing can cause parser differentials and WAF bypass.
Summary
Rack::Multipart::Parser extracts the boundary parameter from multipart/form-data using a greedy regular expression. When a Content-Type header contains multiple boundary parameters, Rack selects the last one rather than the first.
In deployments where an upstream proxy, WAF, or intermediary interprets the first boundary parameter, this mismatch can allow an attacker to smuggle multipart content past upstream inspection and have Rack parse a different body structure than the intermediary validated.
Details
Rack identifies the multipart boundary using logic equivalent to:
MULTIPART = %r|\Amultipart/.*boundary=\"?([^\";,]+)\"?|ni
Because the expression is greedy, it matches the last boundary= parameter in a header such as:
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=safe; boundary=malicious
As a result, Rack parses the request body using malicious, while another component may interpret the same header using safe.
This creates an interpretation conflict. If an upstream WAF or proxy inspects multipart parts using the first boundary and Rack later parses the body using the last boundary, a client may be able to place malicious form fields or uploaded content in parts that Rack accepts but the upstream component did not inspect as intended.
This issue is most relevant in layered deployments where security decisions are made before the request reaches Rack.
Impact
Applications that accept multipart/form-data uploads behind an inspecting proxy or WAF may be affected.
In such deployments, an attacker may be able to bypass upstream filtering of uploaded files or form fields by sending a request with multiple boundary parameters and relying on the intermediary and Rack to parse the request differently.
The practical impact depends on deployment architecture. If no upstream component relies on a different multipart interpretation, this behavior may not provide meaningful additional attacker capability.
Mitigation
Content-Type headers or parses duplicate boundary parameters consistently.boundary parameters.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.2.23 (ecosystem)2.2.23
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3.0.0.beta1, fixed 3.1.21 (ecosystem)3.1.21
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3.2.0, fixed 3.2.6 (ecosystem)3.2.6
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0