surrealdb
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
3.1.0
Fix
- Fixed version
3.1.0cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-63746
SurrealDB: Graph traversal bypasses table SELECT permissions
An authenticated record or scope user could read records on any table reachable through a graph edge or REFERENCES TO back-reference, regardless of that table's PERMISSIONS FOR select clause.
Traversing SELECT * FROM source->edge->target returned full documents from target even when target was defined as PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE. The same bypass extended through multi-hop chains, so any table reachable by a sequence of edges from a readable starting point was exposed.
The root cause: GraphEdgeScan and ReferenceScan fetched records straight from storage without routing them through Document::pluck_select, so the target table's permission expression was never consulted.
Impact
An authenticated record or scope user can read records on any table reachable through a chain of graph edges or back-references from a table they have select on, regardless of the target's PERMISSIONS FOR select clause. Confidentiality-only and bounded to the caller's current database — namespace and database isolation are unaffected.
Patches
A new per-batch permission cache (exec::permission::CachedTableSelect) resolves each target table's SELECT permission once and filters yielded values through check_permission_for_value, matching the regular SELECT code path.
Workarounds
select permission on edge tables whose targets should be hidden.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 3.1.0 (semver)3.1.0
3.1.0cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0