Details
Suggested Fix
Do not use host-process new Function plus source-code blocklists as a sandbox.
Recommended fix direction:
- Disable or clearly mark npm
codeModeas unsafe until a real isolation boundary exists. - Execute untrusted code in a separate OS process, container, worker isolate, or similar boundary with a restricted user, minimal environment, temporary working directory, no inherited secrets, and explicit IPC for allowed tool calls.
- Enforce
allowNetwork,allowedPaths,timeoutMs,maxMemoryMb,allowedTools, andblockedToolsat that boundary instead of by scanning source strings. - Do not rely on
node:vmalone for untrusted code. The Node.js documentation explicitly says thevmmodule is not a security mechanism. - Add regression tests for:
- direct
require('fs')andrequire('child_process')blocked controls; ({}).constructor.constructor('return process')()blocked;process.mainModule.require('fs')unavailable;process.mainModule.require('child_process')unavailable;- host environment variables unavailable unless explicitly passed; and
- tool-call IPC still works for allowed tools.
If maintainers need an emergency mitigation before a real sandbox exists, reject codeMode execution unless the caller opts into "unsafe host JS execution" with clear documentation that it can access the full Node process.
Affected Package/Versions
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Ecosystem:
npm - Package:
praisonai - Component:
src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts - Current npm version checked:
1.7.1 - Refreshed
origin/mainchecked:1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
Confirmed affected range:
>= 1.4.0, <= 1.7.1
Boundary:
1.3.6 does not export codeMode and does not ship dist/tools/builtins/code-mode.js.
No fixed npm version is known at the time of this report.
Version Sweep
The included sweep installs selected npm versions and runs the same vulnerable shape from a script file:
node poc/version_sweep_poc.js
Observed result:
1.3.6: codeModeExported=false, hasDistCodeMode=false
1.4.0: directRequireFsBlocked=true, escapeProcessEnv=true, escapeFilesystem=true, escapeCommand=true
1.5.4: directRequireFsBlocked=true, escapeProcessEnv=true, escapeFilesystem=true, escapeCommand=true
1.6.0: directRequireFsBlocked=true, escapeProcessEnv=true, escapeFilesystem=true, escapeCommand=true
1.7.0: directRequireFsBlocked=true, escapeProcessEnv=true, escapeFilesystem=true, escapeCommand=true
1.7.1: directRequireFsBlocked=true, escapeProcessEnv=true, escapeFilesystem=true, escapeCommand=true
Git history for the TypeScript file points to the 1.4.0 integration:
56f36e25 feat: bump version to 1.4.0 and add AI SDK integration dependencies
2bad9a50 feat: bump version to 1.4.0 and add AI SDK integration dependencies
Advisory History
Checked:
- visible PraisonAI advisories and prior reports;
- public GitHub advisory search results for PraisonAI
codeMode, npm, sandbox,new Function,process, andchild_process; and - visible public PraisonAI advisories for sandbox escapes.
Closest related advisories are Python/PyPI scoped and do not cover this npm TypeScript implementation:
GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp/CVE-2026-39888:pip:praisonaiagentsexecute_code()frame traversal in a Python subprocess sandbox.GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh/CVE-2026-47392:pip:praisonaiPythonexecute_code()sandbox escape throughprint.__self__.- Other published PraisonAI sandbox advisories cover Python
execute_code,SubprocessSandbox, Sandlock/native fallback, or CLI/managed-agent bridges.
This report is distinct because it targets:
- ecosystem:
npm; - package:
praisonai; - component:
src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts; - root cause: host-context
new Functionplus blocklist/name-shadowing sandbox; and - affected range:
>= 1.4.0, <= 1.7.1.
One private npm report has already been submitted for TypeScript AgentOS missing authentication (GHSA-9752-mhqh-h34f). That is also distinct: it covers unauthenticated HTTP agent listing/invocation, not a codeMode sandbox escape.