Marten
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed8.37.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
8.37.0
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45288
Marten has an injection vulnerability in its full-text search regConfig parameter
Summary
Marten's full-text search APIs interpolated the user-supplied regConfig parameter directly into the generated SQL without parameterization or validation, making every code path that exposes regConfig to untrusted input a SQL injection sink.
Affected APIs
IQuerySession.SearchAsync<T>(string searchTerm, string regConfig, ...)IQuerySession.PlainTextSearchAsync<T>(...)IQuerySession.PhraseSearchAsync<T>(...)IQuerySession.WebStyleSearchAsync<T>(...)IQuerySession.PrefixSearchAsync<T>(...)IQueryable<T>.Where(x => x.Search(term, regConfig)) and the matching PlainTextSearch / PhraseSearch / WebStyleSearch / PrefixSearch extension methodsDetails
In the affected versions, `FullTextWhereFragment` renders the WHERE-clause SQL by string interpolation:
private string Sql =>
$"to_tsvector('{_regConfig}'::regconfig, {_dataConfig}) @@ {_searchFunction}('{_regConfig}'::regconfig, ?)";
_regConfig arrives unchanged from the public API surface above. Any value containing a single quote terminates the SQL literal and lets an attacker append arbitrary PostgreSQL.
Confirmed exploit shapes (with regConfig set to attacker-controlled input)
| Goal | Payload |
| --- | --- |
| Time-based blind | english'::text); SELECT pg_sleep(5); -- |
| Information disclosure | english'; SELECT version(); -- |
| DDL execution | english'; DROP TABLE mt_doc_article; -- |
All five overloads listed above produced SQL containing the verbatim payload.
Impact
SELECT statements and exfiltrate database contents through error channels, response timing, or — if the application surfaces query results — directly.UPDATE, DELETE, and pg_sleep-style denial-of-service payloads succeed under the same vector. Concrete impact depends on the database role used by the Marten connection string.regConfig parameter (e.g. a ?lang= query string mapped to regConfig). Applications that hard-code regConfig to a compile-time constant are not exploitable.Patches
Fixed in Marten 8.36.1 (and forward) by #4343.
FullTextWhereFragment now validates regConfig against ^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$ (a simple PostgreSQL identifier, optionally schema-qualified, capped at NAMEDATALEN-1 per side) and throws ArgumentException for anything else. The default value ("english"), schema-qualified configs ("pg_catalog.english"), and the standard PostgreSQL text-search configurations all continue to work.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately, do one of the following at the application boundary:
regConfig to a compile-time constant ("english", "simple", …) and never accept it from request input.regConfig value before passing it to Marten — e.g. against the same regex as the patch (^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$) or against an allowlist of PostgreSQL configurations the application actually uses.regConfig argument from the call site so Marten falls back to the safe default.Resources
Credit
Reported privately to the JasperFx team with a working proof of concept covering all five affected overloads.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 8.37.0 (ecosystem)8.37.0
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0