@aborruso/ckan-mcp-server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.4.112(semver)
Fixed versions
0.4.112
Fix
- Fixed version
0.4.112npm install @aborruso/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-76894
ckan-mcp-server: DataStore Table UI resource does not validate postMessage origin (in) and posts to targetOrigin "*" (out)
Summary
The MCP Apps UI resource (an interactive DataStore table rendered in the host's webview/iframe) communicates with its parent via postMessage. Its inbound message listener performs no event.origin validation, and its outbound messages are sent with target origin '*'. Any window/frame able to reach the document can inject data into the table and interfere with the MCP UI handshake, and the UI's own JSON-RPC messages are broadcast without an origin restriction.
Affected code
src/resources/datastore-table-ui.ts (inline HTML):
window.addEventListener('message', function (event) {
var msg = event.data; // no check of event.origin
if (!msg || typeof msg !== 'object') return;
if (msg.id !== undefined && _pending[msg.id]) { ... resolve/reject pending MCP request ... }
...
if (data && (data.fields || data.records)) initTable(data); // renders attacker-supplied data
});
// outbound:
window.parent.postMessage({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: id, method: method, params: params || {} }, '*');
mcpNot: window.parent.postMessage({ jsonrpc:'2.0', method:method, params:params||{} }, '*');
There is no allowlist of accepted origins for inbound messages and no fixed target origin for outbound messages.
Impact
postMessage to the UI can supply arbitrary fields/records, causing the table to render fabricated rows and links (e.g. a phishing __link_url) that appear to come from the queried portal. (Values are HTML-escaped, so this is display spoofing, not script injection — no XSS.)id resolve/reject the UI's MCP requests, an attacker frame can spoof responses to the ui/initialize handshake or otherwise disrupt the panel.'*' means the UI's JSON-RPC messages are delivered to whatever the parent origin is; if the resource is ever embedded by a context other than the trusted host, those messages leak to it.Exploitability depends on the host embedding model (in a correct MCP Apps host the
parent is the trusted host, which limits who can message the frame), so this is a
hardening / defense-in-depth issue rather than a directly remotely-triggerable
one — hence Low.
Proof of concept
poc/verify-no-origin-check.mjs — static confirmation that the listener has no origin check and outbound uses '*': [x] validates event.origin : NO
[x] outgoing postMessage targetOrigin : '*' (any)
RESULT: VULNERABLE
poc/parent-spoof-poc.html — a page that embeds the UI and injects fabricated rows cross-origin with no handshake; the UI renders them.Remediation
event.origin against the expected host origin on every inbound message; drop messages from other origins.postMessage with an explicit target origin (the host origin established at initialize time) instead of '*'.ui/initialize so only the negotiated host can drive the panel.Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 0.4.112 (semver)0.4.112
0.4.112npm install @aborruso/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0