github.com/obot-platform/obot
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.21.1(semver)
Fixed versions
0.21.1
Fix
- Fixed version
0.21.1go get github.com/obot-platform/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-101084, GO-2026-5678
Obot has an authorization bypass in /mcp-connect/{id} that allows any authenticated user to use any registered MCP server
Summary
If you have the MCP Server ID, you can connect to the MCP server even if you don't have permissions to the server.
The MCP gateway endpoint /mcp-connect/{mcp_id} does not enforce Access Control Rules (ACRs). Any authenticated Obot user who possesses an MCP Server ID can connect to that server through the gateway — including making tool calls — regardless of whether they are a member of any MCP Registry that grants access to the server.
In practice this means any User can fully use MCP servers that the administrator believed were restricted to specific groups.
Severity
Reporter estimate: Critical.
| CVSS 3.1 metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
| Privileges Required | Low (authenticated Obot user, any role ≥ Basic) |
| User Interaction | None |
| Scope | Changed (Obot authorization bypass enables access to data and operations on an upstream third-party service via Obot's stored OAuth credentials) |
| Confidentiality | High |
| Integrity | High (many MCP servers expose write tools — e.g. updateEmployee, submitTimeoffRequest, ticket creation, file writes) |
| Availability | None |
| Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N |
| Score | 9.3 / Critical |
The upstream impact depends on which MCP servers are deployed and what scope their stored credentials hold; the bound is "everything the platform's stored OAuth/API credentials can reach."
Affected Versions
Confirmed on obot v0.21.0.
Vulnerability Details
The intended flow is that a user's authorization is checked during the OAuth process with Obot.
/mcp-connect URL in this case). Obot correctly determines the user's authorization during this flow.Reproduction
Tested on obot v0.21.0.
Setup:
everyone group from the relevant rule.Exploit:
POST https://<obot>/mcp-connect/<mcp_server_id>
Authorization: <session cookie or API key>
Content-Type: application/json
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call",
"params":{"name":"<sensitive_tool>","arguments":{...}}}
The exploit works equally well via Claude Desktop / Claude Code / any MCP-aware client by configuring the gateway URL as a remote MCP endpoint with the user's API key.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 0.21.1 (semver)0.21.1
0.21.1go get github.com/obot-platform/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0