Advisory

GHSA-vw86-c94w-v3x4

Also known as: CVE-2026-40318, GO-2026-5679

Summary

SiYuan: Publish Reader Path Traversal Delete via removeUnusedAttributeView

Details

Summary

The endpoint /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView is vulnerable to a path traversal (CWE-22) that allows an attacker to delete arbitrary .json files on the server.

The issue arises because user-controlled input (id) is directly used in filesystem path construction without validation or restriction.

> Access to this endpoint (e.g., via a Reader-role or publish context) is considered a precondition and not part of the vulnerability. The root cause is unsafe path handling.

---

Steps To Reproduce

  1. Ensure the target instance has the publish service enabled (or any valid access to the endpoint).
  2. Send the following request:
POST /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "id": "../../../conf/conf"
}
  1. Observe that the request is accepted.
  2. The server resolves the path outside the intended directory and deletes the target file.

---

Impact

An attacker can delete arbitrary .json files within the workspace directory.

This may lead to:

  • Deletion of global configuration files (e.g., conf/conf.json)
  • Loss of user data and application state
  • Corruption of workspace metadata
  • Persistent application instability or forced recovery

This represents a server-side arbitrary file deletion primitive, which can have severe impact depending on the targeted files.

---

Technical Details

The vulnerable code constructs file paths as follows:

filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "storage", "av", id+".json")

Because id is not validated, attackers can inject path traversal sequences such as ../ to escape the intended directory.

Example payloads

  • ../local → data/storage/local.json
  • ../../storage/outline → data/storage/outline.json
  • ../../../conf/conf → conf/conf.json

No validation or restriction is applied to:

  • input format
  • path normalization
  • directory boundaries

---

Root Cause

  • Untrusted user input (id) is directly used in filesystem path construction
  • No input validation or sanitization
  • No enforcement that the resolved path stays within the intended directory

---

Remediation

  1. Validate input strictly
  • Only allow valid Attribute View IDs
  • Reject any input containing path traversal sequences
  1. Enforce directory boundaries
base := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "storage", "av")
absPath := filepath.Join(base, id+".json")

if !util.IsSubPath(base, absPath) {
    return error
}
  1. Normalize paths before use
  • Ensure canonical paths cannot escape the base directory
  1. Add additional logical checks
  • Verify that the target object is valid and allowed to be deleted

---

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-04-10 19:32 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:51 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.6.40.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

3.6.40.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1

Fix

  • Fixed version 3.6.40.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1
    go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/[email protected]

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences