Advisory

GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm

Also known as: CVE-2026-32634, PYSEC-2026-2172

Summary

Glances Central Browser Autodiscovery Leaks Reusable Credentials to Zeroconf-Spoofed Servers

Details

Summary

In Central Browser mode, Glances stores both the Zeroconf-advertised server name and the discovered IP address for dynamic servers, but later builds connection URIs from the untrusted advertised name instead of the discovered IP. When a dynamic server reports itself as protected, Glances also uses that same untrusted name as the lookup key for saved passwords and the global [passwords] default credential.

An attacker on the same local network can advertise a fake Glances service over Zeroconf and cause the browser to automatically send a reusable Glances authentication secret to an attacker-controlled host. This affects the background polling path and the REST/WebUI click-through path in Central Browser mode.

Details

Dynamic server discovery keeps both a short name and a separate ip:

# glances/servers_list_dynamic.py:56-61
def add_server(self, name, ip, port, protocol='rpc'):
    new_server = {
        'key': name,
        'name': name.split(':')[0],  # Short name
        'ip': ip,  # IP address seen by the client
        'port': port,
        ...
        'type': 'DYNAMIC',
    }

The Zeroconf listener populates those fields directly from the service advertisement:

# glances/servers_list_dynamic.py:112-121
new_server_ip = socket.inet_ntoa(address)
new_server_port = info.port
...
self.servers.add_server(
    srv_name,
    new_server_ip,
    new_server_port,
    protocol=new_server_protocol,
)

However, the Central Browser connection logic ignores server['ip'] and instead uses the untrusted advertised server['name'] for both password lookup and the destination URI:

# glances/servers_list.py:119-130
def get_uri(self, server):
    if server['password'] != "":
        if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED':
            clear_password = self.password.get_password(server['name'])
            if clear_password is not None:
                server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password)
        uri = 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format(
            server['username'],
            server['password'],
            server['name'],
            server['port'],
        )
    else:
        uri = 'http://{}:{}'.format(server['name'], server['port'])
    return uri

That URI is used automatically by the background polling thread:

# glances/servers_list.py:141-143
def __update_stats(self, server):
    server['uri'] = self.get_uri(server)

The password lookup itself falls back to the global default password when there is no exact match:

# glances/password_list.py:45-58
def get_password(self, host=None):
    ...
    try:
        return self._password_dict[host]
    except (KeyError, TypeError):
        try:
            return self._password_dict['default']
        except (KeyError, TypeError):
            return None

The sample configuration explicitly supports that default credential reuse:

# conf/glances.conf:656-663
[passwords]
# Define the passwords list related to the [serverlist] section
# ...
#default=defaultpassword

The secret sent over the network is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. The client hashes the configured password and sends that hash over HTTP Basic authentication:

# glances/password.py:72-74,94
# For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True):
#     2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit
password = password_hash
# glances/client.py:55-57
if args.password != "":
    self.uri = f'http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}'

There is an inconsistent trust boundary in the interactive browser code as well:

  • glances/client_browser.py:44 opens the REST/WebUI target via webbrowser.open(self.servers_list.get_uri(server)), which again trusts server['name']
  • glances/client_browser.py:55 fetches saved passwords with self.servers_list.password.get_password(server['name'])
  • glances/client_browser.py:76 uses server['ip'] for the RPC client connection

That asymmetry shows the intended safe destination (ip) is already available, but the credential-bearing URI and password binding still use the attacker-controlled Zeroconf name.

Exploit Flow

  1. The victim runs Glances in Central Browser mode with autodiscovery enabled and has a saved Glances password in [passwords] (especially default=...).
  2. An attacker on the same multicast domain advertises a fake _glances._tcp.local. service with an attacker-controlled service name.
  3. Glances stores the discovered server as {'name': <advertised-name>, 'ip': <discovered-ip>, ...}.
  4. The background stats refresh calls get_uri(server).
  5. Once the fake server causes the entry to become PROTECTED, get_uri() looks up a saved password by the attacker-controlled name, falls back to default if present, hashes it, and builds http://username:hash@<advertised-name>:<port>.
  6. The attacker receives a reusable Glances authentication secret and can replay it against Glances servers using the same credential.

PoC

Step 1: Verified local logic proof

The following command executes the real glances/servers_list.py get_uri() implementation (with unrelated imports stubbed out) and demonstrates that:

  • password lookup happens against server['name'], not server['ip']
  • the generated credential-bearing URI uses server['name'], not server['ip']
cd D:\bugcrowd\glances\repo
@'
import importlib.util
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path

pkg = types.ModuleType('glances')
pkg.__apiversion__ = '4'
sys.modules['glances'] = pkg

client_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.client')
class GlancesClientTransport: pass
client_mod.GlancesClientTransport = GlancesClientTransport
sys.modules['glances.client'] = client_mod

globals_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.globals')
globals_mod.json_loads = lambda x: x
sys.modules['glances.globals'] = globals_mod

logger_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.logger')
logger_mod.logger = types.SimpleNamespace(
    debug=lambda *a, **k: None,
    warning=lambda *a, **k: None,
    info=lambda *a, **k: None,
    error=lambda *a, **k: None,
)
sys.modules['glances.logger'] = logger_mod

password_list_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.password_list')
class GlancesPasswordList: pass
password_list_mod.GlancesPasswordList = GlancesPasswordList
sys.modules['glances.password_list'] = password_list_mod

dynamic_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_dynamic')
class GlancesAutoDiscoverServer: pass
dynamic_mod.GlancesAutoDiscoverServer = GlancesAutoDiscoverServer
sys.modules['glances.servers_list_dynamic'] = dynamic_mod

static_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_static')
class GlancesStaticServer: pass
static_mod.GlancesStaticServer = GlancesStaticServer
sys.modules['glances.servers_list_static'] = static_mod

spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('tested_servers_list', Path('glances/servers_list.py'))
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
GlancesServersList = mod.GlancesServersList

class FakePassword:
    def get_password(self, host=None):
        print(f'lookup:{host}')
        return 'defaultpassword'
    def get_hash(self, password):
        return f'hash({password})'

sl = GlancesServersList.__new__(GlancesServersList)
sl.password = FakePassword()
server = {
    'name': 'trusted-host',
    'ip': '203.0.113.77',
    'port': 61209,
    'username': 'glances',
    'password': None,
    'status': 'PROTECTED',
    'type': 'DYNAMIC',
}

print(sl.get_uri(server))
print(server)
'@ | python -

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-16 16:36 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 07:26 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

glances

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.5.2 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.5.2

Fix

  • Fixed version 4.5.2
    pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.2

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences