Details
case "content-type":
val := strings.ToLower(value)
if strings.HasPrefix(val, "application/x-www-form-urlencoded") {
tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set("URLENCODED")
} else if strings.HasPrefix(val, "multipart/form-data") {
tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set("MULTIPART")
}
A request with two Content-Type headers therefore has its body-processor selection silently overwritten by the *last* one, since each call unconditionally calls Set. Meanwhile, ProcessRequestBody extracts the mimeType it passes to whichever processor gets selected from requestHeaders.Get("content-type")[0] -- the *first* value (internal/corazawaf/transaction.go, a few hundred lines below AddRequestHeader) -- and Go's net/http Header.Get (what a typical backend uses) also returns only the first value. So selection follows the last header while everything else follows the first, and the two can disagree entirely.
PoC
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=XyZ
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
with a genuine multipart body containing cmd=evil and a shell.php file upload. Against commit 19b86824:
reqbodyProcessorresolves to"URLENCODED"(the second, spoofed header wins).- The URL-encoded processor runs against the raw multipart body text, parses without error, and produces nothing.
ARGS_POST:cmd,FILES, andFILES_NAMESare all empty -- the entire payload is invisible to any rule inspecting those variables.- The backend (or any integrator using
Header.Get, which reads the first value) still seesContent-Type: multipart/form-dataand parsescmd=eviland the uploadedshell.phpnormally.
Current OWASP CRS includes rule 920620 (Content-Type header sanity check via count/format), which catches this shape; the recommended coraza.conf-recommended has no equivalent, so a Coraza deployment with only custom rules (no CRS) is exposed.
Fix
Only the first Content-Type header may set reqbodyProcessor: guard the existing logic with if tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Get() == "". This makes header-driven processor selection consistent with ProcessRequestBody's own mimeType extraction and with standard Header.Get semantics, without a new field (nothing else can set reqbodyProcessor before headers finish processing; ctl:requestBodyProcessor and ForceRequestBodyVariable both run afterward, in phase 1 rule evaluation and body processing respectively, and are unaffected).
As defense in depth, a rule author can also detect the anomaly directly today, with no code change: SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@gt 1" "deny,..." -- left as a suggested addition to coraza.conf-recommended rather than bundled into this fix, since it is a policy choice (deny vs. flag) rather than a correctness requirement.
AI involvement disclosure
- AI tools/models used: Claude Sonnet 5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code.
- What was generated/assisted: the vulnerability hypothesis and repro shape were supplied by the reporter as an existing written finding; Claude Sonnet 5 independently re-derived the root cause by reading the current source, traced the
mimeType/Header.Getfirst-value asymmetry, wrote and ran a fresh PoC against commit19b86824confirming the full bypass (ARGS_POST/FILES/FILES_NAMESall empty), verified the fix closes it, and drafted this addendum. - Review performed: reproduced by hand against a clean checkout of commit
19b86824before and after the fix using the realTransactionAPI (AddRequestHeaderx2,WriteRequestBody,ProcessRequestBody); confirmed the regression test fails deterministically against the pre-fix code and passes after it; ran the full test suite, the build-tag matrix (coraza.no_memoize,coraza.rule.multiphase_evaluation,coraza.rule.no_regex_multiline), and thetesting/corerulesetCRS regression suite, all green; reviewed by a human maintainer (fzipi) before this addendum was submitted.
Fix: https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza-ghsa-w253-m66g-rx24/pull/2
Patched in 3.8.1
The 3.8.0 fix was incomplete. 3.8.1 completes it: only the first Content-Type header now selects the body processor (the one a typical backend reads with Header.Get), and leading whitespace in the media type, including Unicode whitespace that net/http accepts, is trimmed the way mime.ParseMediaType trims it. Upgrade to 3.8.1; 3.8.0 is listed as affected.
Severity (revised 2026-10-02)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N (5.8, Medium).
Attack Complexity is Low: every form and multipart parser accepts these Content-Type values. The previous vector used Scope Unchanged (5.3).
Impact metrics follow the convention used across Coraza's WAF-bypass advisories: the vulnerable component is Coraza, but the impact lands on the protected application, so Scope is Changed. The bypass hides a payload from inspection; the application still has to be vulnerable to it, so Integrity is Low and Confidentiality is not scored separately.
_AI involvement in this section: Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code, re-derived the CVSS vector from the project's triage guidance (AGENTS.md, "CVSS preconditions get verified, not copied from the report") and drafted this text. A human maintainer (fzipi) chose the S:C/I:L impact convention and directed this update._