Advisory

GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4

Also known as: CVE-2026-47249, GO-2026-5685

Summary

Klever-Go KVM: Hash-array amplification in P2P resolver request handling

Details

Summary
A connected peer can send a compressed RequestDataType_HashArrayType direct request that is only 442 bytes on the wire but expands into 200000 decoded hash entries inside the resolver path. On klever-go v1.7.17, this allows remote memory and CPU amplification against nodes that accept P2P peer connections.

Details
Resolver antiflood logic accounts only one logical message and the compressed wire size in data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30.

Batch.Decompress() in data/batch/batch.go#L122 enforces an inflated byte cap but does not enforce a decoded repeated-field item cap. After decompression, TxResolver preallocates and iterates all decoded hashes in data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194, and TrieNodeResolver iterates the same unchecked decoded set in data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108.

Pinned references:

  • https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30
  • https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/batch/batch.go#L122
  • https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194
  • https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108

This appears distinct from the public CVE-2026-44697 / GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v, which covered MultiDataInterceptor compressed batch fan-in. This report concerns resolver request paths that remain reachable through real libp2p direct-send plumbing on v1.7.17.

PoC
Reproduced with:

go run auditpoc/request_batch_hash_amplification_poc.go
go test github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc -run TestRequestBatchHashAmplification_DirectSendReachability -count=1

Observed output:

request wire bytes: 442
fits direct-send limit (983040 bytes): true
tx resolver lookups: 200000
trie resolver lookups: 200000
heap delta before first tx lookup: 17.47 MiB
ok   github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc

The E2E harness registers the victim resolver on the request topic and sends the malicious payload through SendToConnectedPeer() to prove the work amplification survives the real direct-send path.

Impact
A connected peer can convert a sub-kilobyte request into large decode-time memory pressure and synchronous CPU work on the target node. Repeated requests or several concurrent peers can degrade or exhaust validator resources, affecting node availability.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-05 15:27 UTC
Modified
2026-06-25 23:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/klever-io/klever-go

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.7.18 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.7.18

Fix

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences