Details
- The PoC confirmed the unforced resolver still reuses a version-matching env lockfile, proving the original primitive.
- Patched
switchCliVersion()callsresolvePackageManagerIntegrities()withforce: truewhen committed env-lockfile package-manager entries already satisfy the requested version. - Patched
switchCliVersion()assigns the resolver return value back toenvLockfile. - The installer receives the refreshed lockfile and not the poisoned committed lockfile.
- TypeScript builds passed for
@pnpm/installing.env-installerandpnpm. - The focused Jest regression passed: 1 passed, 1 skipped in
switchCliVersion.test.ts. - ESLint passed for the affected package-manager switch files.
git diff --checkpassed.
Impact
A malicious repository can cause arbitrary package-manager code execution in the victim's developer or CI environment before normal command handling continues. That code executes with the victim user's privileges and can read local secrets, alter project files, mutate dependency state, or run further commands.
Affected products
Ecosystem: npm
Package name: pnpm, @pnpm/installing.env-installer
Affected versions: current main before this patch; direct pnpm execution with package-manager auto-switching and a repository-controlled env lockfile.
Patched versions: pending release containing this patch.
Severity
Severity: High
Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Base score: 8.8
Rationale: the malicious source is repository-controlled package-manager lockfile state delivered through normal supply-chain channels. Exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm directly, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes attacker-selected package-manager code in the victim user's security context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Weaknesses
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Patch
The patch makes automatic package-manager switching re-resolve repository-provided bootstrap metadata before install and execution:
resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()acceptsforce, which bypasses the version-only fast path.switchCliVersion()creates a store controller even when the committed env lockfile already contains satisfying package-manager dependency versions.switchCliVersion()callsresolvePackageManagerIntegrities()withforce: truefor already resolved package-manager entries.switchCliVersion()assigns the returned env lockfile back toenvLockfile, soinstallPnpmToStore()installs from freshly resolved metadata.- The package-manager bootstrap registry hardening from CAND-PNPM-061 is reused, so the refresh happens through trusted package-manager registries rather than repository workspace registries.
Changed files:
installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.tspnpm/src/switchCliVersion.tspnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts
Changeset:
.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md
Pacquet parity:
No pacquet-side patch is required for this finding because pacquet does not implement pnpm's package-manager auto-switch path or installPnpmToStore().
CVSS Reassessment
Initial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H / 8.8 High.
Final CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC still demonstrates the underlying unforced env-lockfile reuse primitive, but the patched execution path force-refreshes package-manager metadata through trusted bootstrap registries before install or execution.
Remaining Risk
The helper resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() still has an unforced fast path that treats matching pnpm and @pnpm/exe versions as resolved. Current execution-sensitive callers either use trusted roots/registries or pass through the patched switchCliVersion() boundary, but future execution paths should use force: true before installing or executing package-manager bytes from repository-provided env-lockfile metadata.