unleash-server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed8.0.3(semver)
Fixed versions
8.0.3
Fix
- Fixed version
8.0.3npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-63466
Unleash: Global Mustache.escape override disables HTML escaping process-wide, enabling Slack/Teams link-injection via unrestricted username
Vulnerability Details
File: src/lib/addons/feature-event-formatter-md.ts
Line: 355 (in v8.0.1; format() method)
Root Cause
FeatureEventFormatterMd.format() does:
Mustache.escape = (text) => text;
const text = Mustache.render(action, context);
mustache (pinned ^4.2.0, confirmed installed 4.2.0) keeps escape as a module-level singleton (mustache.js: mustache.escape = escapeHtml;), read by every Mustache.render() call in the process unless a per-call config.escape override is passed (var escape = this.getConfigEscape(config) || mustache.escape;). Node's module cache guarantees every import Mustache from 'mustache' in the process — feature-event-formatter-md.ts, email-service.ts, webhook.ts, datadog.ts, new-relic.ts — shares the same object instance.
This assignment therefore permanently disables HTML escaping for every other `Mustache.render()` call in the same Node process (including email-service.ts templates) from the moment any single notification addon (Webhook, Slack legacy, Microsoft Teams, Datadog, New Relic) first formats any event, for the remaining lifetime of the process.
feature-event-formatter-md-events.ts (EVENT_MAP) confirms the blast radius: nearly every event's action template interpolates attacker-controlled values with single-mustache (intended-to-be-escaped) syntax, most importantly {{user}}, which is event.createdBy — the acting account's username (or email if set; src/lib/util/extract-user.ts: extractUsernameFromUser). Neither username nor name have any charset/length validation anywhere in the codebase (create-user-schema.ts, create-invited-user-schema.ts, user-service.ts:289 only does Joi.assert(name, Joi.string(), 'Name') — a type check, nothing more).
Slack's own API docs require &, <, > to be replaced with &, <, > before sending user-generated text, specifically so Slack's mrkdwn parser does not interpret it as <url|label> link syntax. Mustache's default escapeHtml happens to produce exactly those entities, so this was (likely unintentionally) the application's only defense against link-injection in chat notifications — and it is unconditionally switched off by the same code path that depends on it.
Attack Scenario
POST /invite/:token/signup is permission: NONE) any Editor-level account and sets username to e.g. evil<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident>.handleEvent() calls this.msgFormatter.format(event), which mutates the global escape function and immediately renders the {{user}}-containing template with escaping disabled.<url|label> Slack link syntax — is POSTed to the team's Slack/Teams channel or webhook endpoint and rendered as a real, clickable, attacker-labeled hyperlink inside a trusted automated notification feed.Vulnerable Code
Mustache.escape = (text) => text;
const text = Mustache.render(action, context);
const url = path
? `${this.unleashUrl}${Mustache.render(path, context)}`
: undefined;
Impact
bodyTemplate that interpolates raw event/user fields directly into a JSON string literal (rather than the pre-escaped eventJson field the code already provides for this purpose) can have its JSON structure broken by an attacker-controlled " character once the global escape function is neutered.Recommended Fix
Never mutate the shared Mustache.escape global. Pass a local escape function via Mustache's per-call render option instead (supported and typed in @types/[email protected]'s RenderOptions.escape):
const renderConfig = { escape: (text: string) => text };
const text = Mustache.render(action, context, undefined, renderConfig);
const url = path
? `${this.unleashUrl}${Mustache.render(path, context, undefined, renderConfig)}`
: undefined;
Verification
Dynamically confirmed on v8.0.1 in a local Docker lab (official unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.1 image + Postgres 15):
bodyTemplate ({{event.createdBy}} etc.), pointed at a local listener.username = evil2<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident> (accepted with HTTP 201, no sanitization)."createdBy": "evil2<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident>" — <, >, | completely unescaped, live Slack link-injection syntax.[email protected] package confirmed the default (pre-bug) output for the same string would have been evil2<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident> — i.e. the single global assignment is solely responsible for the unescaped output observed live.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 8.0.3 (semver)8.0.3
8.0.3npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0