Advisory

GHSA-w4mq-xh27-6xpx

Also known as: CVE-2026-63466

Summary

Unleash: Global Mustache.escape override disables HTML escaping process-wide, enabling Slack/Teams link-injection via unrestricted username

Details

Vulnerability Details

File: src/lib/addons/feature-event-formatter-md.ts
Line: 355 (in v8.0.1; format() method)

Root Cause

FeatureEventFormatterMd.format() does:

Mustache.escape = (text) => text;
const text = Mustache.render(action, context);

mustache (pinned ^4.2.0, confirmed installed 4.2.0) keeps escape as a module-level singleton (mustache.js: mustache.escape = escapeHtml;), read by every Mustache.render() call in the process unless a per-call config.escape override is passed (var escape = this.getConfigEscape(config) || mustache.escape;). Node's module cache guarantees every import Mustache from 'mustache' in the process — feature-event-formatter-md.ts, email-service.ts, webhook.ts, datadog.ts, new-relic.ts — shares the same object instance.

This assignment therefore permanently disables HTML escaping for every other `Mustache.render()` call in the same Node process (including email-service.ts templates) from the moment any single notification addon (Webhook, Slack legacy, Microsoft Teams, Datadog, New Relic) first formats any event, for the remaining lifetime of the process.

feature-event-formatter-md-events.ts (EVENT_MAP) confirms the blast radius: nearly every event's action template interpolates attacker-controlled values with single-mustache (intended-to-be-escaped) syntax, most importantly {{user}}, which is event.createdBy — the acting account's username (or email if set; src/lib/util/extract-user.ts: extractUsernameFromUser). Neither username nor name have any charset/length validation anywhere in the codebase (create-user-schema.ts, create-invited-user-schema.ts, user-service.ts:289 only does Joi.assert(name, Joi.string(), 'Name') — a type check, nothing more).

Slack's own API docs require &, <, > to be replaced with &amp;, &lt;, &gt; before sending user-generated text, specifically so Slack's mrkdwn parser does not interpret it as <url|label> link syntax. Mustache's default escapeHtml happens to produce exactly those entities, so this was (likely unintentionally) the application's only defense against link-injection in chat notifications — and it is unconditionally switched off by the same code path that depends on it.

Attack Scenario

  1. Admin has a Webhook, Slack (legacy), Microsoft Teams, Datadog, or New Relic integration configured (a very common production setup for flag-change notifications).
  2. Attacker has (or self-registers, if public signup is enabled — POST /invite/:token/signup is permission: NONE) any Editor-level account and sets username to e.g. evil<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident>.
  3. Attacker performs any ordinary write action (create/update/toggle a feature flag — routine, no special privilege beyond Editor on one project).
  4. The configured addon's handleEvent() calls this.msgFormatter.format(event), which mutates the global escape function and immediately renders the {{user}}-containing template with escaping disabled.
  5. The resulting message — containing the attacker's raw <url|label> Slack link syntax — is POSTed to the team's Slack/Teams channel or webhook endpoint and rendered as a real, clickable, attacker-labeled hyperlink inside a trusted automated notification feed.

Vulnerable Code

Mustache.escape = (text) => text;

const text = Mustache.render(action, context);
const url = path
    ? `${this.unleashUrl}${Mustache.render(path, context)}`
    : undefined;

Impact

  • Stored markdown/link-injection (phishing-link injection) into any configured outbound notification channel (Slack legacy, MS Teams, Webhook default markdown, Datadog, New Relic), using an attacker-controlled username — no admin privilege required, only Editor on a single project, and potentially reachable through public self-signup.
  • Secondary: loss of HTML escaping for any other reachable Mustache single-mustache placeholder process-wide until restart (increases severity of any other currently-unreached or future Mustache sink, e.g. email templates).
  • Tertiary: a custom Webhook bodyTemplate that interpolates raw event/user fields directly into a JSON string literal (rather than the pre-escaped eventJson field the code already provides for this purpose) can have its JSON structure broken by an attacker-controlled " character once the global escape function is neutered.

Recommended Fix
Never mutate the shared Mustache.escape global. Pass a local escape function via Mustache's per-call render option instead (supported and typed in @types/[email protected]'s RenderOptions.escape):

const renderConfig = { escape: (text: string) => text };
const text = Mustache.render(action, context, undefined, renderConfig);
const url = path
    ? `${this.unleashUrl}${Mustache.render(path, context, undefined, renderConfig)}`
    : undefined;

Verification
Dynamically confirmed on v8.0.1 in a local Docker lab (official unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.1 image + Postgres 15):

  • Created a Webhook addon with the addon UI's own placeholder bodyTemplate ({{event.createdBy}} etc.), pointed at a local listener.
  • Created an Editor-role user with username = evil2<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident> (accepted with HTTP 201, no sanitization).
  • Logged in as that user and created a feature flag (ordinary Editor action).
  • Captured webhook payload: "createdBy": "evil2<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident>" — <, >, | completely unescaped, live Slack link-injection syntax.
  • Control test with the same pinned [email protected] package confirmed the default (pre-bug) output for the same string would have been evil2&lt;https:&#x2F;&#x2F;attacker.example&#x2F;urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident&gt; — i.e. the single global assignment is solely responsible for the unescaped output observed live.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-08-21 19:14 UTC
Modified
2026-08-21 19:40 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

unleash-server

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 8.0.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

8.0.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences