Advisory

GHSA-w6p7-2fxx-4f44

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

  1. Group-based access control is only enforced at authorization time: Group restrictions on OIDC clients (e.g., "only the infrastructure team can access the CI/CD client") can be bypassed by anyone who obtained a refresh token before being removed from the group.

Related

GitHub issue #1390 reports a similar pattern: refresh tokens are not deleted when a session ends via the end-session endpoint. Same root cause (refresh token lifecycle detached from authorization state), different entry point.

Suggested Fix

Primary fix: Re-validate authorization state in createTokenFromRefreshToken

Add the following checks after the refresh token lookup (after line 495):

// Check 1: Verify user is not disabled
if storedRefreshToken.User.Disabled {
    return CreatedTokens{}, &common.OidcInvalidRefreshTokenError{}
}

// Check 2: Verify UserAuthorizedOidcClient still exists
var authorizedClient model.UserAuthorizedOidcClient
err = tx.WithContext(ctx).
    Where("user_id = ? AND client_id = ?", storedRefreshToken.UserID, input.ClientID).
    First(&authorizedClient).Error
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
    // Authorization was revoked - delete this refresh token and reject
    tx.Delete(&storedRefreshToken)
    return CreatedTokens{}, &common.OidcInvalidRefreshTokenError{}
}

// Check 3: Re-verify group restrictions
if !IsUserGroupAllowedToAuthorize(storedRefreshToken.User, client) {
    return CreatedTokens{}, &common.OidcAccessDeniedError{}
}

Secondary fix: Delete refresh tokens on authorization revocation

In RevokeAuthorizedClient, also delete all refresh tokens for the user-client pair:

// After deleting the authorized client record
err = tx.WithContext(ctx).
    Where("user_id = ? AND client_id = ?", userID, clientID).
    Delete(&model.OidcRefreshToken{}).Error
if err != nil {
    return err
}

Both fixes should be applied together (defense in depth).

Self-Review

  • Is this by-design? No. The revocation feature, the disabled flag, and group restrictions all exist to control access. The refresh flow bypassing all three is a bug, not a feature.
  • Are there upstream bounds? No. Refresh tokens are stored independently. No FK cascade, no periodic cleanup, no validation of authorization state.
  • Honest weaknesses:
  • Variant 1 (revocation): The attacker must be the OIDC client operator (they need client credentials and existing refresh token). Userinfo endpoint does return 404 after revocation, which is a partial mitigation. But the id_token issued during refresh already contains all PII.
  • All variants: Requires a pre-existing refresh token, so the access must have been legitimately granted at some point.
  • Existing reports: Issue #1390 covers the related end-session case. No prior security reports for the revocation/disabled/group variants.

Koda Reef

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