Advisory

GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

payload-chars = 2,000,000

=== BASELINE ===
HTTP: 200
server_time_ms: 0.06527...
server_peak_bytes: 2304

=== ATTACK (INVALID signature) ===
HTTP: 401
server_time_ms: 7.53430...
server_peak_bytes: 8000983

=== ATTACK (VALID signature) ===
HTTP: 200
server_time_ms: 6.34682...
server_peak_bytes: 8001061

payload-chars = 8,000,000

=== BASELINE ===
HTTP: 200
server_time_ms: 0.06573...
server_peak_bytes: 2304

=== ATTACK (INVALID signature) ===
HTTP: 401
server_time_ms: 23.03403...
server_peak_bytes: 32000983

=== ATTACK (VALID signature) ===
HTTP: 200
server_time_ms: 22.09702...
server_peak_bytes: 32001061

Why this is strong evidence

  • The server clearly does heavy work before rejecting invalid signatures.
  • The “valid signature” case shows even accepted requests waste resources due to unused payload segment.

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PoC # 3 - Localhost flood / burst concurrency

File: flood_localhost.py
Purpose: sends N concurrent invalid-signature requests over HTTP to demonstrate queueing/worker starvation.

Results (your run: 20 concurrent @ 8,000,000 chars)

total_wall_ms: 1374.5405770000616

(16, 401, 1156.4504789998864, 21.350951999920653, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(19, 401, 1151.2852699997893, 21.208721999755653, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(18, 401, 1102.7211239997996, 21.685218999664357, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(13, 401, 1102.0718189997751, 21.26572200040755, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(11, 401, 1095.9345460000804, 20.586017000368884, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(17, 401, 1085.2552810001725, 22.893039000337012, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(10, 401, 1078.3629560000918, 22.737160999895423, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(7,  401, 1048.2011740000416, 22.476282000297942, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(8,  401, 378.93017700025666, 21.377330999712285, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')
(1,  401, 281.45106800002395, 21.34223099983501, 32000983, 'InvalidSignatureError')

Interpretation

  • Each request still costs ~20–23 ms server processing and ~32 MB peak allocations.
  • But client-observed latency rises up to ~1.15 seconds because requests queue behind each other → clear worker starvation/HoL blocking.
  • All were rejected with 401 InvalidSignatureError → still unauthenticated.

---

Fix

Goal

Prevent unbounded resource consumption from an attacker-controlled payload segment that is unused in b64=false detached flow.

Minimal change strategy

In _load() (or by refactoring parse order), do not Base64-decode `payload_segment` until after you know whether `b64=false` applies.

Two safe options:

  1. Reject non-empty payload segment when `b64=false`
  • Parse header first
  • If b64 is false and payload_segment is non-empty → raise DecodeError *before* decoding
  • Then verification uses detached_payload only
  1. Skip decoding payload segment entirely when `b64=false`
  • Keep payload segment as raw bytes or empty
  • Use detached payload for signing input

This aligns with the idea that detached payload is the trusted payload input for verification; the compact payload segment should not become a resource amplification vector.

(Implementation context: the current decode order and unconditional base64url_decode(payload_segment) are visible in the file and line region around _load() and decode_complete() ([GitHub][1]).)

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Workarounds

  • Enforce strict max token length at the HTTP boundary (proxy/gateway).
  • Apply rate limiting on verification endpoints.
  • If detached JWS (b64=false) is not needed in your app, reject tokens where header includes "b64": false.

Sources & licences