vaultwarden
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.35.4(semver)
Fixed versions
1.35.4
Fix
- Fixed version
1.35.4cargo update -p vaultwarden --precise 1.35.4
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-27898
Vaultwarden has Unauthorized Access via Partial Update API on Another User’s Cipher
Summary
In the test environment, it was confirmed that an authenticated regular user can specify another user’s cipher_id and call:
PUT /api/ciphers/{id}/partial
Even though the standard retrieval API correctly denies access to that cipher, the partial update endpoint returns 200 OK and exposes cipherDetails (including name, notes, data, secureNote, etc.).
Description
put_cipher_partial retrieves the target Cipher but does not perform ownership or access control checks before returning to_json.
Authorization checks present in the normal update API are missing here.
src/api/core/ciphers.rs:717
let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await else {
err!("Cipher doesn't exist")
};
if let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id {
if Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await.is_none() {
err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
}
}
// Move cipher
cipher.move_to_folder(data.folder_id.clone(), &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;
// Update favorite
cipher.set_favorite(Some(data.favorite), &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;
Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
By comparison, the standard update API includes an explicit authorization check:
src/api/core/ciphers.rs:688
if !cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await {
err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
}
The to_json method does not abort processing when access restrictions are not met; instead, it proceeds to construct and return a detailed response.
src/db/models/cipher.rs:175
let (read_only, hide_passwords, _) = if sync_type == CipherSyncType::User {
match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await {
Some((ro, hp, mn)) => (ro, hp, mn),
None => {
error!("Cipher ownership assertion failure");
(true, true, false)
}
}
} else {
(false, false, false)
};
src/db/models/cipher.rs:335
let mut json_object = json!({
"object": "cipherDetails",
"id": self.uuid,
"type": self.atype,
...
"name": self.name,
"notes": self.notes,
"fields": fields_json,
"data": data_json,
...
});
Preconditions
cipher_id.Steps to Reproduce
cipher_id (preconditions).<img width="2014" height="855" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/32b12cc9-3672-4a88-afd0-ef7715474662" />
cipherDetails includes fields such as id, name, notes, secureNote, etc.<img width="2018" height="1113" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/341b330c-8d55-4f06-a622-0d7da28f62fd" />
Potential Impact
favorite or folder operations)./api/ciphers/<cipher_id>/partial includes attachments[].url.In filesystem (FS) deployments, this returns a tokenized endpoint such as:
/attachments/<cipher>/<file>?token=...
In object storage deployments, it returns a short-lived pre-signed URL.
As a result, an attacker can use these URLs to directly download attachment data that they are not authorized to access.
This can lead to disclosure of sensitive information stored in the Vault, including personal data and authentication credentials. Such exposure may further result in account compromise, lateral movement, and other secondary impacts.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.35.4 (semver)1.35.4
1.35.4cargo update -p vaultwarden --precise 1.35.4Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0