Advisory

GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q

Also known as: CVE-2026-86041

Summary

ezBookkeeping: Source-IP allowlist (MCP & API token) is bypassable via a spoofed X-Forwarded-For header

Details

Summary
A remote attacker from any IP address defeats the operator-configured source-IP allowlist (mcp_allowed_remote_ips / api_token_allowed_remote_ips) by sending a single X-Forwarded-For: <allowlisted-ip> header. The router is created with gin.New() and never calls SetTrustedProxies, so gin trusts every proxy by default and c.ClientIP() returns the attacker-supplied header verbatim. The same forged value is also written to Transaction.CreatedIp and the access log, so the attacker's real IP never appears in any record.

Details
cmd/webserver.go:104 builds the router with gin.New(). A grep of cmd/ and pkg/ confirms SetTrustedProxies is never called, leaving gin's default trusted-proxy range of 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0. WebContext (pkg/core/context_web.go:39) embeds *gin.Context and does not override ClientIP().

Both allowlist middlewares match the operator allowlist against this attacker-controlled value:

// pkg/middlewares/mcp_server_ip_limit.go:19
if config.MCPAllowedRemoteIPs[i].Match(c.ClientIP()) { c.Next(); return }

The identical c.ClientIP() is consumed by the audit trail at pkg/api/transactions.go:1078 (createNewTransactionModel(..., c.ClientIP()) → CreatedIp) and the access log (pkg/middlewares/request_log.go:28), so one header both bypasses the gate and forges attribution.

PoC
Runtime PoC (no live deployment required) — pkg/middlewares/xff_bypass_runtime_test.go, pkg/middlewares/xff_chain_runtime_test.go:

go test ./pkg/middlewares/ -run 'TestACCESSCONTROL001_XFFBypass|TestCHAIN_AllowlistBypass' -v

Output:

[control] no XFF, RemoteAddr=1.2.3.4 -> status=400 (correctly blocked)
[exploit] XFF=10.0.0.1, RemoteAddr=1.2.3.4 -> status=200, ClientIP=10.0.0.1 (bypassed)
gate status = 200 | created_ip that would be persisted = "10.0.0.1"

Against a live instance with mcp_allowed_remote_ips=10.0.0.1:

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://target/mcp            # 403 (blocked)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1" https://target/mcp  # passes IP gate

Impact
Defeats an explicitly advertised, operator-configured security control on the MCP and API-token surfaces, from any source IP, with a single header and no authentication to the gate itself. It also destroys non-repudiation: every action is logged under the spoofed allowlisted IP, so audit trails point at the trusted host instead of the attacker. (The MCP/API actions themselves still require a valid token — this neutralizes the compensating IP control, not the JWT layer.)

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-11-09 21:51 UTC
Modified
2026-11-09 22:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.10.0, fixed 1.6.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.6.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences