Advisory

GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Impact:

  • Cost Monitoring Disruption: Unable to retrieve GCP cloud cost data
  • Operational Impact: FinOps processes dependent on cost data are blocked
  • Availability Degradation: Manual intervention required to restore correct credentials

CVSS Impact Score: Availability impact is Low (A:L)

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Scenario 2: Malicious Credential Injection for Data Hijacking

Attack Steps:

  1. Attacker creates their own GCP project and service account
  2. Injects attacker-controlled valid GCP credentials into OpenCost
  3. OpenCost uses attacker's credentials to send requests to GCP Billing API
  4. Target organization's cost data is sent to attacker's GCP project

Technical Details:

# Inject attacker credentials
ATTACKER_KEY='{
  "type": "service_account",
  "project_id": "attacker-billing-project",
  "private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n...\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n",
  "client_email": "[email protected]"
}'

curl -X POST http://opencost:9003/serviceKey -d "key=${ATTACKER_KEY}"

Impact:

  • Sensitive Data Leakage: Organization's cloud resource usage patterns and cost details
  • Business Intelligence Leakage: Can infer business scale, growth trends, technology stack
  • Compliance Risk: Cost data may contain protected business information

Data Leakage Examples:

  • Kubernetes cluster size and node configuration
  • Resource consumption per namespace (can map to business units)
  • Cloud service usage patterns (databases, storage, compute instance types)
  • Cost trends (can infer business growth or contraction)

CVSS Impact Score: Confidentiality impact is None (C:N), but business impact is High

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Scenario 3: Cross-Origin Attack (CORS Exploitation)

Attack Steps:

  1. User visits attacker-controlled malicious website
  2. Malicious JavaScript sends POST request to http://localhost:9003/serviceKey
  3. Due to CORS set to *, browser allows cross-origin request
  4. User's browser acts as proxy to execute credential overwrite attack

Prerequisites:

  • User exposes OpenCost service via kubectl port-forward or other means
  • User's browser can access OpenCost endpoint

Technical Details:

// JavaScript on malicious website
fetch('http://localhost:9003/serviceKey', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
  body: 'key={"type":"malicious"}'
});

Impact:

  • User-Unaware Attack: No active user interaction required
  • Difficult to Trace: Attack originates from victim's IP address
  • Limited Exploitation Conditions: Requires OpenCost exposed to user-accessible network

---

Vulnerability Limitations

What Attacker Cannot Control:

  • File Write Path: Fixed by CONFIG_PATH environment variable, attacker cannot modify
  • File Name: Fixed as key.json, cannot write to other files
  • File Permissions: Write permission is 0644, attacker cannot escalate

Actual Attack Capabilities:

  • File Content Control: Complete control over key.json content
  • Unauthenticated Exploitation: No credentials required to trigger
  • Remote Accessibility: Can be exploited over network (if service exposed)

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Real-World Impact Assessment

| Deployment Scenario | Risk Level | Description |
|---------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Cluster-Internal Only | Medium | Requires attacker to have cluster network access |
| Exposed via Ingress | High | Any internet user can exploit |
| Exposed via NodePort | High | Attackers with node network access can exploit |
| Via port-forward | Medium-High | Local dev environments vulnerable to CORS attacks |

Recommended Risk Rating:

  • Default deployment (cluster-internal): Medium
  • Improperly exposed (public internet): High

---

Remediation

Immediate Actions (P0)

1. Add Authentication

func (a *Accesses) AddServiceKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, ps httprouter.Params) {
    // Add authentication check
    if !a.isAuthorized(r) {
        http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
        return
    }

    // ... existing logic
}

2. Implement Input Validation

func validateServiceKey(key string) error {
    var keyData map[string]interface{}
    if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(key), &keyData); err != nil {
        return fmt.Errorf("invalid JSON format")
    }

    requiredFields := []string{"type", "project_id", "private_key_id", "private_key"}
    for _, field := range requiredFields {
        if _, ok := keyData[field]; !ok {
            return fmt.Errorf("missing required field: %s", field)
        }
    }

    if keyData["type"] != "service_account" {
        return fmt.Errorf("invalid key type")
    }

    return nil
}

3. Restrict CORS

w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", os.Getenv("ALLOWED_ORIGIN"))

Long-term Solutions (P1)

  1. Use Kubernetes Secrets: Store credentials in Kubernetes Secrets instead of files
  2. Implement RBAC: Role-based access control for sensitive operations
  3. Add Audit Logging: Log all file write operations
  4. Apply Least Privilege: Minimize ClusterRole permissions

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Workarounds

Until a patch is available, implement these mitigations:

  1. Network Segmentation: Restrict access to OpenCost service using NetworkPolicies
  2. Disable Endpoint: Remove or disable the /serviceKey endpoint if not required
  3. Monitor File Changes: Alert on modifications to key.json file
  4. Use Read-only Filesystem: Mount config directory as read-only where possible

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References

Sources & licences