Details
Impact
Any application that uses Nodemailer to send mail to a recipient whose domain is subjected to a security or trust decision made with a *different* (UTS‑46‑conformant) parser, and then trusts Nodemailer to deliver to that domain. This includes:
- recipient allow‑list / block‑list / “same corporate domain” checks implemented with
new URL(),url.domainToASCII, a browser‑side check, or an IDN library; - flows that display or log the normalized recipient domain for human confirmation (the shown
company.comdiffers from the deliveredxn--company-pka.com); - any domain‑gated feature (employee‑only registration, “send only to our tenant”, notification routing).
Patched in 9.1.0
Domain encoding now applies UTS-46 (259c32d), so victim@company.com resolves to company.com, matching url.domainToASCII and browsers.
One caveat on the suggested remediation, hardened in b212ac4: url.domainToASCII is a WHATWG host parser, not a pure UTS-46 mapper. It terminates the host at /, \\, ? and # and percent-decodes. Used unguarded it introduces a worse version of the same weakness, since [email protected]/mail.corp.example encodes to the deliverable [email protected] where the bundled Punycode codec left it intact and unroutable. Those characters are now kept away from the mapper.
On severity, "attacker-registrable" is doing significant work in the report: xn--company-pka.com decodes to a label containing U+00AD and xn--mi7cd4afch9d.com to full-width Latin, neither of which Verisign's IDN tables permit for a .com registration. The misdelivery and the confirmation-UI mismatch stand regardless, which is why this is rated level with the comment issue rather than above it.